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 This study challenges current historical assumptions about the nature, scope, and 
timeframe of the 1641 Irish Rebellion in Kerry, Clare, and Limerick counties in western 
Munster.  Placing the start of the popular rebellion in these counties around 1 January 1642, the 
beginning of unrest is set several months further back.  In the process of analyzing the actions of 
popular and organized rebels alike, the motivations for rebellion are characterized as political 
and social rather than religious.  In turn, seventeenth-century Irish society was transformed from 
the traditional narrative of a rigid, religiously-divided society into something far more complex 
and amorphous, with emphasis placed on the importance of local situations, in particular the 
successes or failures of plantation policy and the existence of substantial Protestant populations.  
Though the rebellion would later coalesce along confessional lines after the October 1642 
Confederation of Kilkenny, the initial period of rebellion demonstrates that certain areas of 
Ireland by 1641 had produced religiously heterogeneous societies that served to slightly soften 













15 January 1642.  Near the small town of Glanaroughty, in county Kerry, William 
Seames was having a bad week.  An English  Protestant, Seames was an enterprising yeoman 
farmer in the region; he loaned out cows, heifers, horses and cash to his neighbors – English and 
Irish, Catholic and Protestant – as he and others had done for years in both the settler and native 
communities.  He had a wife, several children, and an extra lease outside of Glanaroughty which 
he farmed apart from his own.1  By the night of the fifteenth that life, which Seames had hewn 
for himself in the isolated southwest of Ireland, had been turned on its head by the rebellion 
which would eventually affect the entire island, culminating in the Confederation of Kilkenny, 
Catholic Ireland’s most formidable attempt at an independent government under the auspices of 
the British monarch.       
 The trouble for Seames started three days prior on 12 January, when a small band of 
rebels led by Fynnen McDermod and Donogh McFynnen, both native Irishmen, rose up in 
rebellion in county Kerry, riding through the countryside and stealing whatever they could find; 
they took cows, horses, and money from Seames and his debtors – even hides, hats, hat-bands, 
and a book of accounts from Robert Sharde.2  Within the next few days—perhaps even hours—
news began reaching Seames from his neighbors and fellow farmers of the robberies that were 
devastating the countryside.  The cows and horses that had remained at his lease outside of 
Glanaroughty had been taken.  The goods and belongings of many Protestant settlers such as the 
Burrell family, the local merchant Henry Coply, and the gentleman Thomas Dight had all been 
pilfered by the McDermod and McFynnen gang.  The economic relationships interwoven within 
                                                           
1 Deposition of William Seames, (Trinity College of Dublin, Manuscript Series MS 828, fol. 198r-v).  
2 William Seames, (TCD, MS 828, 198r).  Deposition of Robarte Sharde, (TCD, MS 828, 248r). 
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the isolated community crumbled as a result.  When William Seames was asked in September 
1643 by Phillip Bisse’s traveling commissioners to put down in writing his experience during the 
rebellion, the first thing he recounted was the debts lost to him as a result of these robberies: 
James and Samuel Burrell owed him £100; the merchant Henry Coply and John Bartholomew 
were indebted to Seames; even the two principal rebels named by Seames were defaulting on 
some sort of debt incurred to him.  All of those named by Seames, owing by his estimation a 
total of £487, were either “out in actual rebellion [or] utterly disenabled by means of this 
rebellion.  Therefore, this deponent can get no satisfaction from them.”3   
 Things took a decided turn for the worse for Seames on the fifteenth when McFynnen 
and McDermod returned to the Glanaroughty area with a larger band of men, either in concert 
with, or as a part of, Captain Sugan’s (Florence McFynnen MacCarthy) larger rebel force.  Early 
in the day, an errant shot was fired into James Burrell’s house by an unknown rebel, striking 
Burrell’s wife Katherine and killing her.  Later Seames, his wife, their children, and others 
totaling what Seames estimated at 140 Protestants of all ages were stripped naked by the rebels.  
When Seames demanded to know why he and British Protestant settlers in general were being 
treated so roughly, Fynnen McDermod replied “that what they did they had the King’s hand and 
seal for it.”4 
 The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, the British Civil Wars, or whichever way one typifies 
the unrest of the late 1630s and 1640s in Britain was undoubtedly the “greatest concentration of 
armed violence to take place in the recorded history of the islands of Britain and Ireland.”5 
William Seames’ experience was not atypical of what many English Protestant settlers 
                                                           
3 William Seames, (TCD, MS 828, 198r). 
4 William Seames, (TCD, MS 828, 198v). 
5 John Morrill, “Introduction,” in The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660, 
edited by John Kenyon and Jane H. Ohlmeyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xix. 
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experienced during the early period of the rebellion in Ireland in late 1641 and through 1642.  
Robberies and violence like those related by Seames led to a general, island-wide breakdown in 
social order as Irish Catholics revolted against all people, places, and things English and 
Protestant.   
 This breakdown, however, was by no means universal or uniform in the way it 
manifested itself.  With the original rising in Ulster, authority there was the first to erode; 
popular unrest quickly spread to western Leinster as local Catholic lords gathered arms and men 
to join the rebellion and the crown’s Protestant officials such as the Marquis of Ormond tried to 
counter its spread.  By spring 1642, in part due to the stalemate between Charles I and the 
English Parliament, the rebellion had quickly reached every corner of the island and Catholics—
both Old English and Irish—were attacking English Protestant institutions and Protestants 
themselves.   
 This initial period of the rebellion, from its outbreak on 22 October 1641 until the 
Confederation of Kilkenny united the island’s Catholics under an alternative government in 
October 1642, is commonly passed over in histories of the period with ominous allusions to the 
“initial period of confusion and chaos.”6  Rebel forces in this period working toward the creation 
of a Catholic Ireland are hard to define and even harder to differentiate from opportunistic 
individuals interested only in robbing Protestants; rebel armies appropriating goods for the war 
effort and bands of thieves are virtually indistinguishable in the historical record.  This disorderly 
period will be the focus of this study, primarily in the three westernmost counties of Munster: 
Clare, Limerick, and Kerry.  These were chosen for several reasons.  First, western Munster is 
understandably left out of most studies of the period.  Most of the rebellion’s action takes place 
                                                           
6 Micheál Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, 1642-1649, (Portland: Four Courts Press, Ltd., 1999), 11. 
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in Ulster and Leinster; even the majority of important events in Munster occur in the east near 
Leinster or around Waterford and Cork.  The lack of focus on the area has led to its events being 
described in sweeping generalizations, if mentioned at all.  Furthermore, the depositions in 
Munster are unique, as they were taken by a traveling commission headed by Phillip Bisse.  Henry Jones, 
the commission’s head, remained in Dublin where the depositions of the other three Irish provinces were 
compiled from refugees who had entered Dublin hoping to find safe passage back to England.7  The Bisse 
depositions examined here are the only accounts taken from British settlers who remained in their local 
areas, and therefore have fewer embellishments than those taken by Jones for the other three 
counties and the information the deponents give is more credible.  Finally, although Nicholas 
Canny has recently studied Tipperary, Waterford, and Cork exhaustively, eastern Munster has 
largely been avoided.8 
 This study attempts to answer two questions; first, what happened in these counties 
during this initial period of rebellion?  While the rebellion’s most important events took place in 
Ulster, Kilkenny and Dublin, conflicts occurred island-wide.  Forces were raised in the name of 
the rebellion by Catholic landowners and peasants alike and English Protestants were robbed and 
murdered in every single county.  Learning what occurred will not only add to the local histories 
of western Munster, but by examining its farthest fringe in its earliest stage will also portray the 
rebellion’s impressive reach and organization.  The second question is broader and harder to 
answer: What was Irish society like in the seventeenth century, and how was it affected by the 
rebellion?  Indeed, our only first-hand accounts of the rebellion, depositions from ordinary 
                                                           
7 Joseph Cope, England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion, (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2009), 34-36. 
8 Canny’s article (“Religion, Politics, and the Irish Rising of 1641,” in Judith Devlin and Ronan Fanning, ed., 
Religion and Rebellion, (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1997), 40-70) specifically covers western 
Leinster and Waterford, and the Youghal area in particular depth.  He also covers Tipperary extensively and Cork as 
well in his eighth chapter of Making Ireland British 1580-1650, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  He 
touches on Limerick and draws only partial from Kerry and Clare.  This study is largely designed to fill the gap he 
has left.  
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British Protestants, portray not only the events which occurred, but also give us clues about the 
heterogeneous communities that resulted from approximately sixty years of active English 
colonization and the nuanced relationships and attitudes which developed therein.   
 It is perhaps important now to also explain what this study is not designed to do.  As the 
three counties in Munster examined here are more isolated (Kerry and Clare, especially) and less 
planted than their eastern counterparts, the conclusions drawn in this study should not necessarily 
be extrapolated to Cork, Tipperary, or Waterford – much less the entire island.  While recent 
historical trends have shown that the political motivations and events of all of Charles I’s 
dominions are interrelated and should be considered holistically (e.g., the conflict is increasingly 
called the ‘Wars of the Three British Kingdoms’ rather than the ‘English Civil War’), to assume, 
in such a localized study as this one concerning interactions between individual settlers and 
rebels, that what happened to William Seames or Robert Sharde in county Kerry could be related 
to events in Oxford or London would be foolhardy.  Furthermore, Munster had been 
experiencing British plantation since the 1580s; the settler/native communities developed there 
were unique even within Ireland: plantations were far younger and Catholics and Protestants 
more divided elsewhere.  While certain aspects of the rebellion and community interaction are 
shared (indeed, these similarities are often the only evidence we have of a rebel force’s 
connections with the wider rebellion), the conclusions drawn here are often specific to Munster 
or even to the individual counties themselves; inferences to other areas should be made with 
caution. 
 Due in large part to these differences in local conditions in Ireland, even within a small 
area like western Munster, this study is organized regionally.  The first chapter provides the 
broader political and historical background for the events of the next three chapters.  Included is 
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the general narrative of British hegemony in Ireland up to the rebellion, and its major events until 
the 1643 one-year cessation of hostilities signed between the Marquis of Ormond and the 
Confederation of Kilkenny.  The discussion is necessarily focused mainly on the history and 
events of Munster.  Chapters two, three, and four relate the events of Kerry, Limerick, and Clare, 
respectively.  The actions of rebel forces and the popular violence (if any) in each county are 
detailed and, perhaps more meaningfully, important aspects of seventeenth-century Irish society 
such as Irish Catholic attitudes in 1641 and Munster’s religious awareness in general are inferred 
from the language and actions of both the rebels and the Protestant deponents who gave the 
accounts. 
 What emerges from this analysis is a rich, complex society which, while classified along 
confessional lines, did not always adhere to these simplistic categorizations.  Radical stereotypes 
of Catholics painted by Protestants and the reverse had long outstripped the realities in both 
England and Ireland.  Stories of barbaric and bloodthirsty Catholics had circulated for decades in 
England; they became the quintessential monster in any good Protestant’s closet.  Catholics 
were, by the 1640s, the proverbial “other” in Protestant British society.  Irish and Old English 
Catholics were considered complicit in the rebellion and guilty of the acts of their fellow 
Catholics based on confessional affinity alone.  Interestingly, religion was used far less as an 
excuse for violence and robbery than ethnicity or nationality; even in cases in which the category 
was deployed, it is clear that there was no demarcation made between the settlers’ religious 
persuasion and his or her ethnic background.  Protestant religion and English birth had collapsed 
into one encompassing classification.  The political disenfranchisement and the confiscation of 
land that had been owned by Gaelic Irish landowners as little as fifty years ago was what the 
Irish rebels—especially the Irish participating in popular violence—were rebelling against.     
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It was only after the Confederation defined itself in October 1642 as characteristically 
Catholic that the rebellion attained its distinctly religious flavor.  Although religious practices 
and symbols were what various Catholic priests attempted to direct popular violence toward, this 
type of confessional-based violence was rare amongst rebels acting of their own accord in the 
first year.  As can be seen in William Seames’ account given at the beginning of this chapter, it 
was not his family’s Protestant prayer books that the McFynnens took, but their horses and 
clothes; it was not Robert Sharde’s Anglican Bible that the rebels stole, but his book of accounts.  
Rather than the religiously-driven wanton destruction of Protestantism that John Temple 
described, what the Irish were actually attempting to achieve was a reversal of English interests 
in Ireland, and a return to a traditionally Irish way of life.  That Catholicism was a necessary part 
of this proposed new Ireland was a result of the conjunction of religious and ethnic 
classifications into two disparate groups, one English and Protestant, the other Irish and Catholic.  
In contrast to the strictly political conflict in England, where neutrality was possible, the 
pervasive nature of religion in seventeenth-century Britain (and Europe in general) meant that 
any conflict between the two sides would necessarily be placed in a religious context.  Indeed, 
the Old English Catholics, who balked when rebellion first broke out, were forced to join the 
rebellion in response to it being couched by Parliament and Protestants as a religious conflict, 
when in fact the rebellion was an uprising by Irish Catholics against the political 
disenfranchisement and property confiscations of the last century.  The sectarian nature of the 
initial conflict was due to common seventeenth-century classification methods, not to legitimate 
grievances of a religious nature. 
 Finally, this study will also strike down some of the generalizations made about the 
rebellion’s events in these remote areas.  The date of the beginning of unrest will be pushed 
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farther back.  Whereas spring and summer are often the vague dates given for the beginning of 
unrest and hostilities in Munster, this study will conclusively show that by 1 January 1642 the 
rebellion had reached these three counties and affected the residents sufficiently that authority 
had essentially dissolved.  Secondly, the commonly held notion that popular violence was 
somehow absent in Munster will be challenged.  While Kerry follows this rule, Clare and 
Limerick experienced popular violence and robberies not directed by the “official” rebel forces 
in those counties.  Though these counties certainly did not see the same level of violence as 
Ulster or Leinster, they experienced enough to be considered an important aspect of these 
counties’ rebellion experience.  
This study will portray—be it through local Irishmen and women sheltering their 
Protestant neighbors from attack, Protestant settlers freely converting to Catholicism, or simply 
the conduct of rebels upon capturing British strongholds or robbing British households—that the 
settler societies which evolved in Munster were far more complex and amorphous than is 
generally considered.  However, to better understand the popular violence experienced in 
Munster and Ireland in general, we must first examine the situations and relationships from 
which the rebellion, begun on 22 October 1641 when Sir Phelim O’Neill took Charlemont and 







1 BACKGROUND AND EVENTS 
At the beginning of the twelfth century Ireland was a largely homogenous, Gaelic 
population that lived primarily as nomadic herdsmen.9  The Norman invasion of Ireland in the 
1170s established the entire island as a possession of the English Crown by the end of the 
century.  This slowly gave way to a policy of feudal colonization through the granting of land 
titles to Norman lords and barons.10  As the decades passed, these Norman lords governed their 
fiefs in Ireland independently of the English kings, despite still technically owing allegiance to 
the English monarchy.  In reality, the English Crown had very little say in what happened in 
Ireland outside of the area immediately around Dublin.  Furthermore, the imposition of an 
English ruling class gave Ireland a new, multiethnic edge which was unlike any other societal 
dynamic in the British Isles. 
 The next and perhaps most important addition to the socio-religious dynamics in early 
modern Irish history had its origins in England.  The first important event, Henry VIII’s 
insistence upon the whole of England breaking with Rome to satisfy his need for divorce, created 
a religious divide between the English king and the Old English lords who ruled Ireland in his 
name.  Secondly, Henry’s 1541 assumption of the throne of Ireland, making Ireland a kingdom 
rather than a lordship, indirectly announced his intention to rule Ireland more directly.  Although 
these events were not the genesis of many of the actions which shaped Ireland from the mid-
sixteenth through the seventeenth century, they created both the religious dichotomy and the 
political impetus which often influenced English policies and attitudes in Ireland for several 
hundred years. 
                                                           
9 For a more in-depth view of Ireland and Irish society in the Middle Ages see: Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland: 
The Enduring Tradition, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1988). 
10 Karl S. Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 4. 
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 One such policy, created by Henry VIII as a result of his need to not only have a stronger 
hand but a more legitimate rule in Ireland, is commonly referred to as surrender and regrant.  
Surrender and regrant was the English monarchy’s attempt to reinforce the feudal relationships 
between English king and Irish or Old English lords which had been ignored for centuries.11  
Through this policy, Irish and Old English lords who often claimed to be the sole proprietors of 
their Irish lands were allowed to keep their possessions unmolested if they first symbolically 
surrendered that land to the English monarchy.  In return, these nobles had their land granted 
back to them at the king’s courtesy along with a new, English title.  This subtle change was part 
of the attempted anglicization of the Irish ruling class.  As Brendan Kane has recently pointed 
out, this move to appropriate the Irish and Old English ruling classes was due to the “significant 
points of social and cultural contact between England and Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland.”12  
These cultural similarities (e.g., Gaelic family names are remarkably similar in both form and 
function to English titles) were, according to Kane, the entire reason surrender and regrant was 
viewed as viable in place of an economically debilitating conquest.  Indeed, Kane states that 
Anthony St. Leger, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in the 1540s and key English proponent of the 
policy, “looked upon the Irish nobility as a co-optable one.”13   
This policy worked with varying degrees of success in Ireland, with some Old English 
and/or Irish families eager to end their ambiguous relationship with the English monarchy, while 
others looked at it as an encroachment on their sovereignty.  In Munster, for example, two 
families that are integral to the story of the rebellion took advantage of this opportunity.  The Old 
English Boyle family surrendered their claims to sole possession of their south Munster lands 
                                                           
11 Bottigheimer, English Money, 6. 
12 Brendan Kane, The Politics of Honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 21. 
13 Kane, The Politics of Honour, 27, 3-27. 
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and Richard Boyle became the Earl of Cork.  The Gaelic Irish O’Brien family, ancestral rulers of 
the isolated province of Thomond (modern Clare), also accepted fealty under the English 
monarch and received the Earldom of Thomond.  These families would also, though not 
immediately, eventually convert to Protestantism in an attempt to curry even more favor with the 
English court.   
While surrender and regrant, as Kane has shown, was based upon reasonable premises, its 
weakness came in its failure to recognize the recalcitrant nature of Old English and Gaelic Irish 
nobles and their fiercely independent past.  The failure of the policy led to numerous rebellions 
(the Desmond rebellions of the 1570s and 80s in Munster being perhaps the best example of 
reaction against the imposition of English rule) and demonstrated that Gaels could not be coerced 
into surrendering their independence.  It also showed that the Old English, despite identifying 
with England as their ancestral homeland, maintained major differences of opinion with the 
Crown’s policies, most notably in the monarchy’s intolerance of the Catholic faith.   
After the Desmond rebellions and the realization of Surrender and Regrant’s inability to 
bring Ireland to heel inexpensively, the English crown decided if it could not coopt or create a 
docile and prosperous Ireland, it would simply import one.  England now considered the best 
way of avoiding further rebellion, which would have to be crushed militarily, was colonization.14  
The “policy of plantation” borne from this realization became the most lasting and important 
Tudor policy with respect to seventeenth-century events.15  The vast, confiscated lands of the 
Earl of Desmond presented the English crown with the opportunity to settle parts of Ireland with 
an industrious and obedient English population, and throughout the 1580s the monarchy began 
                                                           
14 Bottigheimer, English Money, 10-11. 
15 Bottigheimer, English Money, 9. 
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leasing the fertile Munster farmland to lords, commercial groups, and other adventurers under 
the pretense that the land would be settled strictly with English settlers, and all Catholics—be 
they Irish or Old English—would be forced off the land.  
The machinations of the Munster plantation have been detailed by Michael MacCarthy-
Morrogh, but perhaps the most important lesson that can be gleaned from the experiment is that 
it largely failed.  The potential rewards and promised lands advertised across England were not 
enough to entice settlers to the often tumultuous island that was full—as many English had been 
taught for years—of barbaric Papists and Gaels eager to taste English blood.16  Furthermore, the 
forcing of Irish tenants off their land by plantation created a vast pool of laborers and potential 
tenants who did not have to be moved from England.  The more unscrupulous adventurers were 
willing to take advantage of this, often renting their land back to the same Irish families they had 
forced off at rents three or four times higher.  By 1592, nearly a decade after the initial plans of 
plantation had been put forth, these developments forced the English crown to decrease its goal 
of planted English tenants in Munster from 577,645 to 202,099.17  This number also proved far 
too unreasonable, as historians’ best estimates suggest that perhaps a tenth of that number of 
Protestants resided in Munster at the beginning of the rebellion in 1641. However, it is harder to 
estimate how many settlers had reached Munster by the end of the sixteenth century, as the entire 
settlement and its infrastructure was nearly completely destroyed by the rebellions which struck 
the province in October 1598.18    
                                                           
16 Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583-1641, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).  Most pamphlets which circulated in England about Irish and Catholics in 
general were little more than hysterical propaganda.  Joseph Cope, England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion, (Suffolk: 
Boydell Press, 2009). 
17 Bottigheimer, English Money, 12. 
18 Toby Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641-1760 (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2004), 3.  Bottigheimer, 
English Money, 13.   
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While the haphazard enterprise failed for various reasons, some in Munster found ways to 
profit.19  The Earl of Cork, who became one of most important actors in Irish politics in the first 
half of the seventeenth century (up to his embarrassment at the hands of Lord Deputy 
Wentworth), created most of what would become his Munster-based empire by shrewdly 
acquiring the confiscated lands piecemeal.20  After gaining the lease on 20,000 acres in the 
original Munster plantation, Cork spent the last decade of the sixteenth century securing 
numerous unsuccessful plantations that were originally granted to adventurers and nobles who 
had either managed the land poorly or did not have the resources to complete their own 
objectives.21  This period culminated in his purchase of Sir Walter Raleigh’s 42,000 acres in 
1602, the largest original grant of land over which Raleigh had been an exceptionally poor 
steward.22  Through Cork’s shrewd buys and exploitation of Irish land, labor, and resources, he 
developed a large economic base from which he launched his political career.  Cork’s personal 
finances were in such good order that when the rebellion began in 1641, he immediately spent 
vast quantities of money to restock and rework the local defenses of the settlements and cities 
under his purview.23 
While the failure of the Munster plantation, in part due to planter incompetence and in 
part due to open rebellion, allowed men like Cork to amass vast tracts of land at considerable 
discounts, for the English Crown it provided lessons.  The crown now realized the immense 
                                                           
19 While the reasons above are what most historians have pointed to as the causes for failure, including MacCarthy-
Morrogh (The Munster Plantation) and Nicholas Canny (Making Ireland British), most contemporary commentators 
claimed—perhaps most vociferously Edmund Spenser—that failure was ultimately due to the English’s failure to 
first clear out the Irish, whether by deportation or annihilation (Bottigheimer, English Money, 13).   
20 Hugh F. Kearney, Strafford in Ireland 1633-41: a Study in Absolutism, (Manchester: The University Press, 1959).  
Bottigheimer, English Money, 11-12. 
21 Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British 1580-1650, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 313-327.  
22 Bottigheimer, English Money, 12. 
23 Jane Ohlmeyer, “The Civil Wars in Ireland,” in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, ed., The Civil Wars: a Military 
History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1660, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75. 
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amount of time, money, and manpower necessary if plantation—or any other English settlement 
of Ireland—was to be successful.24  These hard-learned lessons would be applied in later 
plantations, because although the plantation of the Desmond lands was one of the first attempted 
English colonizations of Ireland, it was certainly not the last.25  The 1607 Flight of the Earls, 
where several Ulster lords (including the patriarchs of the O’Neill and O’Donnell clans) fled to 
the continent for fear of being arrested by English authorities, opened up vast stretches of 
territory in Ulster which could be leased to adventurers.  Thomas Wentworth attempted in the 
1630s to confiscate and plant the lands of the Earl of Clanricard in Connacht despite the Earl 
being an obedient subject of the Crown and having ironclad titles to his lands. 
Plantation was increasingly seen by the English crown as a way of preventing further 
rebellion by marginalizing and removing the economic base of past and potentially future 
enemies.  Settlement itself was not limited strictly to English Protestants; many leading Scottish 
families took advantage of plantation lands offered by the crown and settled on the coast of 
Ulster in lands that had been confiscated after the Tyrone Rebellion ended in 1603 or abandoned 
in the Flight of the Earls.  The Scots in general settled the Irish land better than their English 
counterparts, largely due to the good relations and contact that had been kept up for centuries 
between the MacDonnells of Ulster and the MacDonalds of western Scotland.26  Though the 
Scots are relatively inconsequential to our story in western Munster, they become an important 
piece in the story of the rebellion, as Robert Monro’s disciplined Covenanter army scored 
                                                           
24 Bottigheimer, English Money, 22. 
25 Leix and Offaly (renamed King’s County and Queen’s County, respectively) were partially planted during the 
mid-sixteenth century, though not to the extent that Desmond’s former lands in Munster were.  G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 
“Conciliation, Coercion, and the Protestant Reformation, 1547-71,” in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne, 
ed., A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 77-
79. 
26 David Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates: Scottish-Irish Relations in the mid-Seventeenth 
Century, (Antrim: W & G Baird Ltd., 1981), 8-11. 
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significant victories against the Confederates while the English were concerned primarily with 
their own civil war. 
Politically, the first half of the seventeenth century created most of the 
disenfranchisement of Catholics that helped spur the rebellion.  With the accession of James I in 
1603, both Catholics and Protestants in Ireland felt they had reason to rejoice.  Protestants 
assumed that James, a Protestant from birth, would consolidate what late sixteenth-century 
plantation and conquest had begun.  Catholics, meanwhile, assumed that the son of Mary Stuart 
would be more sympathetic to the interests of a religion his mother had openly practiced.  In 
reality, James’ policies and attitude toward Ireland were similar to Elizabeth’s; Ireland was a 
nuisance at its worst, a source of revenue at its best.  The major changes of the first half of the 
seventeenth century came from inside Ireland itself.  Districts were packed and rearranged by Sir 
Arthur Chichester and the Irish Privy Council to create the first Protestant majority in the Irish 
House of Commons in the landmark 1613-15 parliamentary sessions.27  Catholics, both Old 
English and Irish, despite still owning the majority of land in Ireland, would never again have 
control of the Irish Parliament as it existed under the English Crown. 
When Charles I succeeded to the throne in 1625, Catholics in Ireland again felt they had 
reason to be optimistic, but results proved ambiguous.  Though the Graces of 1628 which 
“articulated [Catholic] concerns for the security of land tenure and requested that the crown not 
only guarantee existing rights of ownership but end its policy of plantation” were requested by 
the Old English in Ireland and initially promised by Charles, their implementation was never 
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realized.28  Blocked both by the Irish Privy Council and the Irish Parliament itself, Charles’ 
conviction on the issue diminished significantly once peace was made with Spain and his need 
for Irish money dissipated.  Regardless of the concessions Charles made at times when it was 
politically and financially advantageous, Catholics in Ireland and Britain were still, as a general 
rule, discriminated against; Charles himself described them as “half-subjects.”29 
 Catholics again were thrown into a state of uncertainty when in 1632 Viscount Thomas 
Wentworth, elevated as the first Earl of Strafford in January 1640, became Lord Deputy of 
Ireland and ruled, in his own words, “thoroughly.”  Though he personally abhorred Catholicism, 
Wentworth was a servant of Charles first.  He refused to favor Protestant policies and goals 
explicitly unless it supported the aims of the English crown.30  Instead, he favored a sophisticated 
and initially successful approach of playing factions—Old English and New English, both and 
the Irish, Catholic and Protestant—off one another in order to gain the largest advantage both for 
the English crown and for his own person as Charles’ deputy in Ireland.  While Wentworth’s 
strategies turned Ireland, for the first time ever, into a revenue source rather than an economic 
drain for the English Crown, he did it at the expense of public favor.31   
 In March 1640 Wentworth, still very much in control of parliamentary events in Ireland, 
attempted to secure from the Irish Parliament grants to pay for a 9,000-man army and an 
additional six subsidies to be paid to the King over a three-year span.  The House of Commons, 
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after some debate (Old English members vehemently opposed any subsidies without the 
implementation of the Graces), granted four subsidies while also drafting a letter professing 
endless loyalty on behalf of all of Ireland for Charles I.  Indeed, when Strafford left later in 1640 
for England, the only news from Ireland was peaceful: the Protestant clergy who sat in the upper 
house had approved Strafford’s original six subsidies plan, and the arrangements he had made to 
raise new troops were going smoothly.32 
 This apparent placidity, however, was short-lived.  Wentworth, before his departure, had 
initiated the collection of the first subsidy without the Commons’ approval, causing uproar.  Sir 
Christopher Wandesford, Wentworth’s deputy whom he left in charge, was forced to prorogue 
Parliament until 10 October 1640 to avoid the ratification of a petition demanding the 
government’s attention to forty-four grievances against Wentworth and his policies.  When 
Parliament did reconvene, tempers were no cooler and no official business was transacted, as the 
Commons demanded a reduction in the amount of each subsidy and the reinstatement of 
boroughs which Wentworth had gerrymandered away to ensure a parliamentary majority in the 
government’s favor.  Wentworth’s skillful manipulation of Ireland’s fractious ethno-religious 
groups was breaking down.  New English and Old English, at odds in the Irish Parliament since 
the Protestant settlers had first arrived, were briefly united, and only in their universal opposition 
to Strafford’s policies.33  Strafford had few friends in England, and the personal empire he had 
built in the Crown’s name in Ireland was used against him.  The 9,000-man army he had 
commissioned in Ireland became a symbol of what Charles’ opponents saw as the Crown’s 
increasingly Catholic leanings and its designs against the English Parliament.  Strafford was put 
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on trial for treason, and was later executed in May 1641 via a bill of attainder.  Charles, eager to 
have Irish money and troops, sacrificed Strafford and made further concessions to the Irish 
Parliament, including several which would guarantee Catholic land titles.34  The only grievance 
that Charles outright refused to consider was the Irish Parliament’s assertion of its right to 
determine the laws of Ireland with Charles’ assent, independent of the English Parliament.35   
 Ironically, despite the ascendancy of the Protestant New English population in both 
political power and land ownership, only about 10% of the population was of English Protestant 
stock.  In Munster in particular, there were only approximately 22,000 first or second generation 
New English settlers in Munster.  These settlers tended to cluster around the major cities of Cork, 
Youghal, Tallow, Bandon, Kinsale, and to a lesser extent, Limerick, whose urban and outlying 
rural land was still dominated by primarily Catholic, Old English citizens.36  Despite the 
confiscations, Catholics still owned approximately 59% of Irish land at 1641.  Considering that 
by 1688 Catholics had only retained 22% and that that number was further reduced to 14% by 
1691, it is clear that the attempted coup by Irish and Old English Catholics in the 1640s 
represents a pivotal moment in Irish political and religious history.37   
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 The lack of any real political power for the majority of the population was the proverbial 
powder keg which required a match.  This was provided by a group of heavily indebted Gaelic 
Catholic nobles and lords in Ulster.  The story of the conspirators of the Ulster rebellion has been 
told numerous times, and consists of two parts.38  After a spring and summer of covert planning, 
Phelim O’Neill and a group of co-conspirators decided to rise in Ulster, taking as many English-
controlled fortresses and towns as possible.  Simultaneously, a group led by Conor Maguire 
would take Dublin Castle and the stores of arms and powder within, holding out until 
reinforcements could arrive from Ulster.  Though one bold historian has claimed this second part 
of the plot was fabricated after the fact, it is generally accepted this was the plan.39  
Unfortunately, due to an inebriated co-conspirator who got cold feet the night before the 
intended storming of the Castle, the local magistrates were notified of the plot and the 
conspirators in Dublin were foiled.   
The failure in Dublin is perhaps the most important reason why the plot escalated into a 
full-blown rebellion and island-wide breakdown in authority; the original plan of the conspirators 
was not to create the quasi-independent Irish state that the rebellion later became.  As several 
historians have noted, the O’Neill and Maguire conspirators were originally attempting to use the 
Anglo-Scottish crisis: an uncharacteristic weakness in the English political and military machine 
which the Covenanters had astutely exploited, and which these disenfranchised Irish noblemen 
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saw as a chance to bolster their negotiating position.40  In essence, the taking of Dublin Castle 
and the Ulster strongholds was supposed to be the Irish Catholics’ Newcastle. 
Despite the failure in Dublin, O’Neill’s Ulster rebels were experiencing far greater 
success.  On 22 October 1641, soon after dark, Phelim O’Neill and a small band of Irish 
Catholics took Dungannon and Charlemont castles to the southwest of Lough Neagh through 
various forms of deception.  At Charlemont, for instance, O’Neill pretended to be a dinner guest 
and upon entering overtook the guards and proceeded with his band of men to take over the 
castle.41  Within three days the rebels had captured enough castles and towns to mount a serious 
threat to British authority in Ulster.42  For the first three weeks of the rebellion O’Neill’s forces 
remained smaller bands taking English castles and settlements until 10 November, when he 
assembled his first sizeable force, possibly as large as 3,000 men and horses, at Lisburn.43  On 24 
November 1641, the rebels scored their first major military victory against English governmental 
forces at Julianstown.44   
For the understanding of events in Munster it is important to note that the rebellion 
spread to Tipperary and Waterford by December 1641, and, most historians claim, reached 
Clare, Cork, and Limerick by spring 1642, though when it did it broke in isolated instances.45  
There are, however, depositions which maintain that acts of violence and rebellion were seen in 
Clare and Limerick as early as Christmas 1641, and it would seem from the evidence that these 
                                                           
40 Padraig Lenihan, Consolidating Conquest: Ireland 1603-1727, (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008), 91.  
Also, Corish, “The Rising,” in A New History, 291. 
41 Canny, Making Ireland British, 469. 
42 M. Perceval-Maxwell, The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion in 1641, (Quebec City: McGill University Press, 
1994), 213-15.  
43 Lenihan, Consolidating Conquest, 95. 
44 Canny, Religion and Rebellion, 44. 
45 Jane Ohlmeyer, “The Civil Wars in Ireland,”in The Civil Wars, 73-102, 73-4.  Martyn Bennett, The Civil Wars 
Experienced: Britain and Ireland, 1638-1661, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 57. 
21 
 
reported attacks are symptomatic of an earlier start to the rebellion in these areas rather than 
isolated incidents.46   
As haphazard forces sprang up across Munster, disarray and confusion became the order 
of the day.  In the last few months of 1641, before the rebellion had even reached Munster 
proper, simply the fear of the rebellion was disrupting trade in the province.  Later in 1642, war 
and unrest in England further dislocated the Irish economy, as it not only eliminated the 
possibility of tangible aid but also halted demand for Irish goods in Ireland’s main export market.  
This maelstrom of economic bad fortune helped to spur, according to Gillespie, the one year 
cessation of hostilities signed between English forces and the rebels in 1643.47 
Adding to the confusion, in July 1642, 1000 men sent by the English Parliament under 
the Scottish commander Lord Forbes landed west of Cork in Munster and plunged into the 
countryside, pillaging and plundering Catholic settlements without apprising Lord Inchiquin, the 
Crown’s commander of forces in Munster.  This loud and bumbling enterprise was not hard to 
catch up with, and Forbes was ambushed at Clonakilty by rebel forces, after which he retreated 
to Kinsale and sailed first west and then north where he ravaged coastal settlements in Clare and 
Galway before returning to England. 48    
As the Crown amassed what troops it could, in eastern Munster the rebels massed their 
largest force under Richard Butler, Viscount Mountgarrett, who joined the rebellion on 30 
November 1640.  The uncle of the Protestant Marquis of Ormond, James Butler, Mountgarrett’s 
forces had effective control of all of county Tipperary within two days.  From there they 
continued into the heart of Munster, into north county Cork, where they overran several 
                                                           
46 Martyn Bennett is the first to have noted this in The Civil Wars Experienced, 57. 
47 Gillespie, “The Irish Economy,” in Independence, 165. 
48 Bottigheimer, English Money, 81-2. 
22 
 
settlements, the largest being Mallow.  This force, however, disbanded soon after this victory due 
to bickering between Mountgarrett’s commanders over objectives.49  Military units in Munster 
on both sides of the conflict seem often to have disassembled as quickly as they mustered.  This 
is in part due to the amorphous nature of both the rebellion proper and popular rebellion, but was 
also caused by the severe lack of funds officials of the English government in Ireland received as 
the lines of communication and allegiance in England got considerably more tangled.  Lord 
Inchiquin continually complained to the Marquis of Ormond of a lack of resources necessary to 
maintain a substantial force.  This forced Inchiquin into a conciliatory position with the rebels, 
causing him to remain in castles or fortress towns.50  He repeatedly reported to Ormond of unrest 
among his troops concerning back pay and poor supplies throughout the early stages of the 
rebellion, and in January 1643 he wrote that he feared his troops would disband themselves, 
irrespective of his orders or those from the Crown.51 By June 1643 there were only 6,000 troops 
paid by Parliament in Munster, and only part of this force was under Inchiquin’s command.  This 
number pales in comparison with Ulster and Leinster, where the English government had 20,000 
and 15,000 troops respectively.52  In July 1644, Inchiquin would defect from the crown to 
Parliament and renew his fight with the rebels, but even then he received only meager funds.53 
The Irish rebels were more organized than their opponents, and soon after the Irish 
Confederacy was instituted at Kilkenny in October 1642, Garrett Barry was given control of the 
6,000-strong rebel army in Munster.  Inchiquin, despite having a force of roughly half that 
number, defeated Barry’s forces outside of Liscarroll in the Blackwater Valley.  However, 
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strapped for supplies and resources, he could not press his advantage.  The weakness of 
Protestant forces in Ireland—and Munster especially—presented the Catholic rebels with easy 
opportunities to score victories and gain important strongholds while armies like Inchiquin’s 
were stalled, waiting for supplies and direction.54  By December 1642, the rebels controlled 
nearly every castle and city in Munster outside of Cork.55  Coupled with the landing of more 
siege guns from the continent in April 1643, adding to the few they had gleaned from towns and 
English fortifications, the Irish conquest of Munster rapidly sped up and further disadvantaged 
Inchiquin.56  Eventually, Inchiquin reluctantly signed the one-year truce Ormond negotiated with 
the rebel forces in September 1643, but only because he had little choice at the time.  The 
September 1643 truce brought an end to most of the fighting in Munster.57 
These are the important actors and events in Munster leading up to and during the first 
stage (from breakout to 1643 cessation) of the Irish rebellion.  What has not yet been explored is 
how anger at the political disenfranchisement and property confiscation manifested itself at the 
community level.  Indeed most historians, it seems, would rather “explain why 1641 occurred 
rather than to consider what happened.”58  The popular revolt that took place concurrently in the 
majority of the country has received far less attention.  While we owe a great deal of gratitude to 
the likes of Aidan Clarke and M. Perceval-Maxwell for their treatment of parliament and the 
nobility, the revolt is all too often viewed by those focusing on political affairs as a specifically 
Ulster event; the rebellion, as Canny has stated, must be viewed both as a political coup d’état 
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and a popular insurrection.59  Different parts of society—whether Catholic priests, Protestant 
landowners, or Gaelic chieftains—exploited their local situation to achieve their own 
objectives.60  As the following chapters will demonstrate, it is important for us to examine the 
reactions—both of the political elite and population in general—in each region.   
For example, the Catholic clergy throughout Ireland attempted to focus the energies of 
the rebellion into religious purposes: be it the destruction of Protestant Bibles, prayer books, or 
places of worship.61  Many Catholic priests who had come to Ireland or Irish priests who had 
returned by 1641 had been trained on the continent, bringing the fervent teachings of counter-
Reformation Catholicism with them.62  As David Stevenson has noted, Franciscan missionaries 
from the continent were active as early as 1619 and reporting positive results in all of Ireland and 
even western Scotland.63  Many Catholic clergy saw the rebellion as their greatest opportunity to 
practice full, counter-Reformation theology for the first time in Ireland.  Perhaps as a result of 
this feeling, the clergy may have fostered the popular rebellion in places.  However, these 
militant clergymen were often unable to keep the rebellion purely religious in its objectives, with 
violence often being perpetrated against English and Protestants themselves, rather than simply 
their religious objects and practices.64  Surprisingly, some Catholic priests adopted a charitable 
attitude toward their previous oppressors; many were responsible for aiding and abetting escapes 
of Protestant residents who became the targets of such attacks.65  This supports the idea that 
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although the Catholic clergy supported the rebellion, most, if not all, did not support the 
individual acts of violence against Englishmen or Protestants.66   
This example alone is proof of the diverse and nuanced aims of different groups who 
took part in the popular rebellion.  The relative neglect the popular rebellion has received in 
historical study is in response to the credibility of sources for which nearly all of the observations 
of the period at the community level must be derived: the 1641 depositions.  Most of the 
depositions cannot be assumed to be entirely truthful.  Indeed, the depositions “[are] often 
inaccurate, biased, and misleading.”67  For example, the claims made by deponent Robert 
Maxwell of county Armagh that 154,000 Protestants were killed in Ulster are definitively false.68  
Our best estimates today are that by 1641, only 15,000 British Protestants were even settled in 
Ulster, rendering Maxwell’s figure impossible.69  Even more prevalent in the depositions than 
outright fiction is hearsay.  The standards of taking eyewitness testimony were not the same as 
they are today.  During the first round of depositions taken in 1642 and 1643, the witnesses were 
encouraged by the recorders to repeat not just everything that had happened to them, but any act 
of the rebellion or Protestant human suffering they had heard of.70  For instance, several 
deponents report that at Newry an unborn baby was ripped from the womb of its Protestant 
mother and tossed into a ditch.71  Despite this story appearing numerous times in depositions 
from various counties, not a single deponent witnessed the act or could name its perpetrator or 
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victim.  It is unlikely then that this grisly event actually took place; it was simply one of the 
numerous rumors about the rebellion and Catholic bloodlust which proliferated at this time.   
The depositions transcribed by Henry Jones and his officials in Dublin are rife with these 
inaccurate, second-hand stories; the account related by Ellen Matchett in county Armagh 
provides an excellent example of what pertinent information can be taken from the depositions 
and what cannot be used.  Of use is Matchett’s account of how she and her husband had been 
expelled from their house by a small band of rebels and robbed of most of their household goods, 
horses, and livestock.  Although some were strangers, she named the attackers she recognized: 
the O’Hanlons and O’Hagans of county Armagh.  She continued, relating her and her daughter’s 
harrowing escape to Michael Dunn’s house in Hockley, whose wife “being an English 
gentlewoman” offered them shelter where they hid for some time, forced to survive on whatever 
they could forage: “they could get a few nettles & course weeds to eat & sometimes when they 
got but the brains of a Cow dead of diseases: boiled with Nettles they accounted that good 
fare.”72  While Matchett’s experience is most likely true, the rest of her deposition relating events 
she did not witness in person are suspect, and at times definitively false.  For example, her 
account of the massacre of Protestants in a house in Shewis is almost entirely inaccurate.  The 
details of the deposition of Ann Smith and Margret Clark, who were lucky enough to be only 
“knocked in the head”73 by the Irish rebels as they fled the burning house, contradicts the story 
told by Matchett.  Where Matchett claims that 110 English Protestants had crept into an outhouse 
for safety, Smith and Clark tell how they were driven into a thatched-roof home by the rebels, 
and estimated only that forty English Protestants filled the house.  Matchett further states that the 
rebels continued to force fleeing Protestants back into the fire until “they were all burned to 
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death & consumed.”74  Smith and Clark’s very survival long enough to give a deposition 
contradicts Matchett’s story.  Even more so than just relating incorrect details, the end of 
Matchett’s deposition is full of rumor and fabrication.  Manus O’Cahan, an Irishman from 
Loughgall, supposedly “begged for his breakfast the heads of all the protestants of Sir Phelim 
Roe O’Neill” and that later “his request was granted.”75  While this is certainly one of the more 
outlandish claims made by anyone in the depositions, it exemplifies the biases present in portions 
of the accounts.  Embellishment beyond one’s own personal experience was encouraged, and it 
manifested itself often in the secondary and tertiary accounts of Irish Catholic atrocities.   
Even though the depositions of the survivors forms “a body of material which is 
emotional and which seeks to represent Irish Catholics in the worst possible light, … this 
Protestant testimony cannot be ignored,” if only because they provide our only insights into the 
direct effects of the insurrection on the population.76  If John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer are 
correct it was not only political issues, but also widespread “rural unrest and urban misery 
[which] created conditions that were ripe for revolt.”77  In order to understand the rebellion in its 
entirety, we must look not only at the political wrangling and major events described above, but 
also grasp what occurred in Ireland’s communities to comprehend the motivations for Irish 
Catholics to join the rebellion proper or engage in popular violence. 
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2 COUNTY KERRY 
County Kerry, like its counterpart across the Shannon county Clare, is an isolated 
province.  Composed largely of two peninsulas which jut out into the Atlantic, most of the 
county is made up of hilly, rocky terrain, suitable mainly for animal husbandry rather than 
agriculture.  This fact most likely kept Kerry sparsely settled—by either English or Irish—in 
1641.  Even today, Kerry only boasts a population of 140,000, and its largest town, Tralee, a 
mere 20,000.  Given the paucity of records which survive for Kerry, it is impossible to estimate 
the seventeenth-century population of Kerry, though not its composition.  The vast majority of 
Kerry was native Irish.  What few British settlers there were tended to reside in urban centers, 
like Tralee.78   
 Most historians have largely approximated the beginning of the rebellion in county 
Kerry.  While some have claimed rebellion first spread to Kerry in the spring of 1642 or even 
late in the summer, most Protestant deponents report their first encounter with rebels being far 
earlier in 1642.  Thomas Turner, Moses Dowdall, and William Love all reported having their 
goods taken from them around Candlemas, in the first few days of February.79  William Seames, 
whose personal story was related in the introduction, first encountered violence in mid-January.80  
In addition, William Hayles, had his cows and horses taken by Captain Sugan and a company of 
approximately 100 men on 14 January.81  Still earlier, William Lascells, John Newman, Henry 
Coply, and several others report first encountering rebels in the first week of 1642.82  Richard 
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Taylor claims his goods were taken from him “around Christmas,” 1641.83  Many of these 
reports are not simply isolated attacks; the siege of Tralee Castle, Stephen Love described, began 
on 14 February 1642.84   
 Furthermore, the robberies and violence that these settlers encountered in early 1642 was 
both from larger bands and from opportunistic individuals.  Both the McFynnens and Capt. 
Sugan already had large forces in the county in January.  When Seames was taken prisoner by 
Charles MacCarthy and Capt. Sugan, he estimated their force to be 300 strong.85  That number is 
corroborated by several witnesses, including Michael Vine who witnessed the forces in mid-
February after he took refuge in Tralee Castle.86  The independence of the force is blurred; 
despite multiple deponents mentioning the armies of the McFynnens and Capt. Sugan 
independently, they were more than likely one and the same.  Which family—McFynnens or 
MacCarthys—initially raised the force is unclear from depositional evidence alone, but by 
February Sugan was clearly the leader, and there was most likely one principal band of rebels in 
the county.   
While Sugan’s force appears to be the only thing resembling an operational army in 
county Kerry, it is hard to be certain if he was in contact with members of O’Neill’s Ulster 
rising; Sugan was killed in August 1643 and left no writings.  The only evidence of any contact 
between Sugan and the rebellion proper in Ulster and elsewhere is circumstantial.  For example, 
many members of Sugan’s forces, when asked to justify their actions by Protestant deponents, 
gave a response similar to that of their northern counterparts: they were rebelling in the king’s 
name and against the English hegemony in Ireland and the Protestantism that came with it.  
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Charles, in most rebels’ eyes, was not only complicit in the rebellion but openly supportive.  The 
second, and perhaps most convincing piece of evidence, is Sugan’s coordinated sieges of two 
castles in county Kerry.  Fortified positions most likely would not have been attacked unless 
Sugan had an interest in clearing out English-controlled strongholds; this was something the 
peasant rebellion in Leinster lacked and was prevalent among the rebellion proper only after the 
confederacy was established in October 1642 and a formal attempt at a legitimate, separate 
government of Ireland was made.  As Rolf Loeber and Geoffrey Parker have pointed out, Irish 
troops had traditionally excelled in skirmishes and ambushes while the English often attempted 
to control the countryside from urban fortresses or stand-alone castles; for either of the sides 
venturing far into each other’s domain was a foolhardy risk. 87  This is in part why we see so 
many Protestants in all of Ireland fleeing to castles or cities after either being attacked or upon 
hearing of unrest nearby. 
 While the majority of the reports come from deponents claiming harassment by Sugan or 
forces under his command, there are multiple depositions which report isolated attacks by minor, 
most likely independent rebels.  Many of these attacks seem personal in nature; the English 
deponent often knew his attacker well enough to be able to give their name, occupation, and 
sometimes even residence in the deposition.  Gilbert Harvey, for example, was stripped of his 
clothes by Art O’Leary, a neighbor he apparently knew well.88  Despite these incidents, it should 
be noted there was no widespread peasant uprising as took place in Ulster and in western 
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Leinster.89  Most of the robberies and violence which took place in county Kerry can be traced 
back to agents or forces commanded by Capt. Sugan or the McFynnens.  For example, though 
men like Owen O’Sullivan or Walter Hussey are named several times as the only perpetrator, 
they are mentioned enough times in the company of Sugan, or other MacCarthys, McFynnens, 
and McDermods that it can reasonably be assumed that even if they were acting independently, 
they were doing so in an effort to gather supplies and arms for Sugan’s larger force.   
If Sugan had the only large force in the county and there are no reports of Protestant 
troops ever entering Kerry, the question remains, what were these forces gathering supplies for?  
The answer is perhaps our best proof of a link between Sugan’s forces in the county and the 
rebellion proper: the systematic siege of Protestant castles and strongholds within the county.  
The Irish typically did not conduct sieges in the early-modern sense; their arms and tactics were 
better suited to open-field skirmishes.  Indeed, as Loeber and Parker have shown, Ireland came 
into contact with the continental military revolution through its returning officers, as many had 
been formally trained in Flanders and/or Spain in the latest military tactics and weaponry.  Men 
like Owen Roe O’Neill and Thomas Preston returned to their ancestral homeland and would 
come to form the base from which the Confederate military would be created.90  Before their 
arrival, siege warfare would be haphazard at best, and enticing only if the force’s motive was to 
root out all English and Protestant authority.  Sieges occurred—in county Kerry and the island in 
general—at castles, towns, or even churches when the group of Protestants taking shelter inside 
were perceived as a potential threat to the future of the rebellion.91  Castles, after all, were often 
of extreme importance to the English settlers both as safe garrisons and outposts which could 
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provide advanced warning for nearby residents.92  Furthermore, at the beginning of the rebellion, 
before the continental officers had returned to Ireland with both men and supplies, the rebel 
forces in general lacked any sort of artillery; the cannons and siege equipment located in Munster 
were brought over by English adventurers and settlers to protect their land and towns in the late 
sixteenth century.  The artillery they did have was procured in the taking of English fortresses 
and castles.  For example, when Limerick Castle fell to the rebels in June 1642, the rebels 
captured three large cannon, one that commentators reported weighed over 800 standard pounds 
and fired thirty-two pound shot.  So rare was artillery in seventeenth-century Ireland that there 
are several reports during the rebellion of castles surrendering to rebels who had siege 
equipment, the warders merely terrified by the sight of such destructive pieces.93  Regardless, the 
steps and munitions necessary for the siege of a castle full of Protestants means it was highly 
unlikely that a few bands of opportunistic rebels would have endeavored something as lengthy 
and costly as a castle siege if their only objective was loot and wanton violence against 
vulnerable Protestants. 
Documentation of two such sieges remains from the depositions of county Kerry.  The 
first and best documented was the siege at Tralee Castle.  Tralee Castle, according to Stephen 
Love, was under siege from 14 February 1642 until sometime in August.94  Other deponents 
place the beginning slightly earlier in February.95  It appears the entire force Sugan had 
organized as of February was present at the siege.  While certain deponents estimate his forces at 
600, 700, or even 3,000-strong (this estimate also says Sugan commanded a cavalry of 100 
horses, which is almost surely untrue; while horses were certainly present, it is doubtful any 
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rebel forces this early in the rebellion included any company of trained cavalry), the force was 
most likely around 300 men, especially at the beginning of the siege.96  Soon after the siege 
began, Tralee itself was plundered by the rebels, most likely in search of supplies and arms.  One 
deponent claims the siege was conducted by “freeholders and gentlemen.”97  This speaks not 
only to the impromptu nature of the force at Tralee, but the likely composition of Sugan’s forces 
in general.  Sugan’s force in Kerry—at least at this stage in the rebellion—was certainly 
haphazardly assembled, led and organized by his kinsmen and local gentry.  More evidence of 
this comes from Stephen Love, who tells us that Edmund Hussey rode into Love’s hometown of 
Killarney as early as 15 November 1641 and exhorted the residents to convert to Catholicism and 
gather arms in order to join him in open rebellion.98 
While we know accurately when the siege began and ended, what occurred during the 
siege of Tralee itself is somewhat unclear.  Most of the accounts we have of what went on inside 
the castle are second-hand extrapolations by deponents and therefore suspect at best.  Due to the 
absence of any reports of violence or other settler-rebel encounters during the rebel plundering of 
the town of Tralee, most residents had likely either taken refuge in one of two local castles 
(Ballycarty Castle being the other) or fled the city.  With the approach of the rebel army, most 
denizens would have stopped all activities and fled to the castle out of terror of Catholics or rebel 
forces in general.  With news of the rising in Ulster spreading quickly, several dozen had most 
likely taken refuge before Sugan or other Kerry Catholics had risen up themselves.  Estimates of 
the number of English Protestant settlers who had taken refuge in Tralee Castle vary wildly, but 
a rough approximation of 300-500 refugees most likely resided in the castle when the siege 
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began.  With that number warded up in a small castle, supplies surely ran out quickly.  The 
best—and probably most accurate—account of the conditions inside Tralee Castle comes to us 
from Michael Vine.  Driven from his house in the town of Tralee by the approaching rebels, he 
describes the conditions thus:  
he [the deponent] saith that they were forced to eat raw salt hides that did stink 
and drink some water that was as black as ink and as thick as if it were thicked 
with flower and other water as if it were thicked with yellow clay and he saith that 
died for want and killed by the enemy there at least two hundred of the men, 
women and children during the siege of said castle.99 
 
This is a typical account of what occurred inside most castles under siege during the early 
rebellion.  The Protestant settlers, startled and exposed by the unexpected uprising, likely had 
little time to gather their belongings, let alone prepare supplies for a protracted siege in an 
overcrowded castle.  Vine’s account of hunger and want inside the besieged castle is further 
corroborated by fellow warder Teige MacMahowny, who claims that by August the refugees 
were forced to begin eating the neighborhood cats and dogs.100  The number of Protestants who 
died of dearth within the castle is accurate as well; all other first-hand accounts of the siege 
estimate the number of dead within the castle in the 150-200 range.  So dire did the situation 
become near the end of the siege that soon upon being released and driven away from Tralee 
Castle by the rebels, Elizabeth Harris’ husband drank water from the first puddle he saw, 
contracted an illness (probably dysentery) and died within days.101      
   The siege itself seems to have been more of a smoke and mirrors effort than anything 
else. Given the lack of artillery controlled by rebel forces, especially in such a remote county 
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as Kerry, this is not surprising.  Furthermore, what artillery and cannon shot the rebels did 
possess was likely not enough—both in size and in number—to bring down the walls or 
battlements of a castle.  Furthermore, as the rebels were without the direction of the 
continental-trained Catholic rebels who would arrive later in the year, their attempts at even 
using the artillery they did have competently was most likely primitive at best.  For example, 
at Tralee the rebels brought newly acquired cannon to the castle near the end of April and shot 
thirteen or fourteen times against the walls.102  Having little effect (and possibly having run 
out of ammunition and gunpowder), the rebels’ heavy fire lasted only one day, and soon after 
they may have begun mining operations against the castle walls, though reports of this 
activity—and the subsequent Protestant countermining which purportedly killed “many 
rebels”—are uncorroborated and suspect at best.103  With few resources with which to strong-
arm their way into the castle and little threat from a relieving English Protestant force, the 
rebel army seemed content to wait out the Protestants within. 
 The time at which the castle was given up to the rebels—August 1642—seems to be 
the only thing about the surrender the deponents agree on.  Some claim that the castle could 
have held out far longer and did not need to be given up when it did.104  By most accounts 
however, Tralee Castle was surrendered upon terms agreed upon by the Protestants within and 
the rebel leaders.  The warders, driven by the extreme conditions inside the castle walls, 
probably concluded terms more out of necessity than any desire to settle with their attackers.  
The rebels, if they indeed were acting in concert with the rebellion proper, were probably 
more than willing to settle with the besieged as their objective was to eliminate an English 
                                                           
102 Michael Vine, (TCD, MS 828, 207r). 
103 Deposition of William Dethick (TCD, MS 828, 236r). 
104 Deposition of Daniel Spratt (TCD, MS 828, 205r). 
36 
 
stronghold in the countryside, not the wholesale murder of British Protestants.  The agreement 
purportedly guaranteed the safety of the Protestant warders and what few of their goods 
remained.  The quarter given, however, was far less generous.  Most deponents report that 
upon Tralee Castle being surrendered, most English deponents who had survived the siege 
were robbed of their belongings and stripped of their clothing.  With the exception of a few 
reported isolated incidents of warders being hanged upon leaving the castle by Sugan’s men, 
the warders were generally unharmed; that is, if one can consider being left naked and 
penniless in the Irish winter unmolested. 
 The experience at the other Protestant stronghold in Kerry is depicted in only one 
deposition, but it is a unique one: the deposition, titled “Deposition of John Abraham & 
others,” is one of the few that credits multiple authors.  John Abraham gave the principal 
account, which was then corroborated, revised, and added to by several other warders of 
Ballycarty Castle.  Ballycarty Castle was located just two miles outside of Tralee, and it is 
where most of the farmers of the surrounding area took refuge when Sugan’s army appeared 
in the area.  According to the account, nearly 300 men, women and children sought refuge in 
the castle.  The piecemeal nature of warders assembling in castles and local strongholds is 
displayed best in this deposition: Nicholas Roberts said he first sent his two daughters and 
wife to take refuge in Ballycarty Castle in the middle of December 1641 when he first heard 
news of unrest.  He joined them two weeks later.105 
 Ballycarty Castle’s experience was characteristically different in that the Protestant 
warders did not put up a fight.  According to Abraham, the castle was surrendered to forces 
loyal to Capt. Sugan on 20 November 1642, who had most likely made their natural 
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progression to the next Protestant stronghold after eliminating the English threat at Tralee 
Castle.  Though the details are murky, it would appear that with the agreement of the 
deponents the castle was given up by the local constable Robert Blenerhasset and the castle’s 
owner, Sir Edward Denny.  Under the agreement made between these leaders and the rebel 
forces, the castle was surrendered with the condition that the English Protestants who had 
taken refuge there and their belongings would be given quarter and safe passage to an English 
garrison in Cork, where all those who would not submit to an Irish Catholic government 
would be sent back to England.  The deponents, though told this before the surrender by 
Robert Blenerhasset, claim that no such deal ever actually existed, and as at Tralee three 
months prior the warders were stripped and robbed and forced to depart the castle unprotected 
from either rogue rebels or the weather.106 
 These are the two principal accounts we have of castle sieges which took place in 
Kerry.  The prolonged siege Tralee Castle experienced and the similar treatment at the hands 
of the conquerors of both castles mean that not only was Sugan’s force largely unopposed in 
the county (probably due to Inchiquin’s lack of resources and his preoccupation with larger 
forces in more populated parts of Munster in Cork, Limerick, and Waterford) but that it was 
also almost certainly working in concert with the wider, island-wide rebellion; this was no 
band of marauding Catholics seeking wanton violence and destruction of Protestant property 
and persons.  Indeed, in respect to other counties in Ireland, Kerry is relatively bereft of 
accounts of rebels acting alone.  The accounts of the two castles above are the most recurrent 
events related in the Kerry depositions, and those that relate to other sieges are generally from 
residents of county Kerry who migrated during the unrest and confusion, encountering 
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violence in Limerick or Cork.107  What accounts of rogue rebels that exist are far too brief and 
extraordinary to make any widespread conclusions about popular violence in the county; it 
cannot be considered a substantial phenomenon at all.   
 Perhaps predictably, the violence experienced by the settlers in county Kerry, whether 
occurring around castles or on the deponent’s own property, which best reveal seventeenth-
century Irish society are most suggestive of the underlying motives of the Catholic rebels.  
One of the most prevalent acts in the encounters between English Protestant settlers in county 
Kerry and hostile rebels is the stripping of Protestants.  Almost all of the deponents who 
provide credible accounts of the violence describe some type of forcible removal of clothing.  
John Abraham and his fellow deponents claim that all three hundred men, women and 
children who had taken refuge inside Ballycarty Castle had the clothes literally taken off their 
backs when the castle was peacefully surrendered to Sugan’s men.108  Perhaps the most 
interesting part of William Seames’ story, whose personal account was told at the beginning 
of this study, is that when the “seven score” Protestant settlers who had resided near 
Glanaroughty were rounded up, they appear to only have been stripped of their clothing and 
nothing else.  Cathy Cox, a resident of county Kerry who had fled to Cork soon after her 
family was robbed in January, heart-wrenchingly described watching her two children die of 
exposure after their clothes were taken by a small band of rebels.109  Phineas Lascells was 
stripped by the Donnell McFynnen’s servants, and Margaret Percy was stripped by Catholic 
strangers.110  John Johnson, likely one of the approximately 140 Protestants described by 
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Seames, even reported hearing Donogh McFynnen instruct all of the Irish around 
Glanaroughty to rob and strip all Protestants they came in contact with.111   
The ritualized stripping appears to have served only a symbolic purpose; at this point 
in the rebellion there was no regular army which needed to be clothed and/or uniformed.  It 
should also be noted that there are only a tiny amount of credible accounts—absolutely zero 
in the three counties in this study—of this indiscriminate stripping of victims ever becoming 
sexual.  As stripping and robbing was often accompanied by minimal violent interaction, the 
raping of Protestant victims may have worked against the Catholic rebels in a number of 
ways.  First, with some robberies being physically non-violent, the rape of the victims would 
have crossed a threshold of sorts, adding an unrestrained level of debasement to an otherwise 
orderly process.  Second, rape and defilement of the settlers would have only served to enrage 
local Protestant populations and provide a rallying cry and a tangible reason to organize and 
counter the rebellion.  After all, as the accounts at Tralee and Ballycarty Castle convey, the 
English Protestant settlers had little impetus to openly oppose the rebel forces as long as they 
could guarantee the safety of their families and livelihoods.  Though the second of these 
priorities was often lost (though, it should be noted, most pre-surrender arrangements, like 
that of Tralee and Ballycarty Castles, attempted to protect Protestant goods, whether or not 
they were adhered to by the conquering rebels) the raw debasement of Protestant bodies—a 
fate often seen as worse than death in early-modern Christendom—would certainly have 
raised the ire of settlers who without it were disposed to accept their fates as Protestants at the 
mercy of rebelling Irish Catholics.  Furthermore, stripped and being left both literally and 
symbolically exposed, Canny has suggested, may have been considered more degrading than 
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rape.112  In addition, most credible accounts that depict the Catholic clergy maintain that most 
clergymen attempted to direct the violence toward Protestant symbols, not Protestants 
themselves.  If the clergy was as influential in rebel policy in the early stages of the rebellion 
as they were once the Confederation of Kilkenny was solidified, this may have also dampened 
the level of physical violence perpetrated by Catholic rebels.  While it may be reading too 
much into the situation to contend that individual rebels and their leaders were acting with 
these nuanced assumptions in mind, the absence of rape in accompaniment with the stripping 
of settlers means there was little urge among the rebels to exact physical harm upon the 
Protestant settlers whose clothes they were taking. 
    On a deeper level, the stripping of Protestant settlers inverted the shifting political 
and social situation in Ireland.  Since Henry VIII’s decision to take a stronger role in Ireland’s 
governance, power and influence in Irish policy increasingly became concentrated in Dublin 
and the executive at the expense of Irish and Old English Catholic landowners.  As more 
Protestant settlers entered the region, any power which migrated back into the provinces was 
allocated in their hands.  This is best represented in the 1613-15 Irish Parliament, which, 
despite the island’s population still being overwhelmingly Catholic, had a majority Protestant 
makeup during all of its sessions.113  In less than a century, Catholics had gone from being 
technically outlawed but essentially untouchable, to a persecuted political minority.  The 
stripping of Protestants, though most likely not on a conscious level for the rebels, 
symbolically and violently returned Catholic landowners to the position of power which had, 
historically speaking, abruptly been taken from them.  The humiliation of Protestant settlers 
                                                           
112 Canny, Making Ireland British, 545. 
113 See Michael Perceval-Maxwell, The Outbreak of Irish Rebellion of 1641, (Montreal: Queen’s University Press, 
1994), and Aidan Clarke, The Old English in Ireland 1625-42, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966). 
41 
 
through stripping, placing them in the helpless and powerless state which Ireland’s Catholics 
had increasingly found themselves in during the seventeenth century, symbolically satisfied 
rebel inclinations to return to the political and social climates of the fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries. 
 While the stripping of Protestants after capture, robbery, or the surrendering of a 
stronghold is the most prevalent encounter between rebels and Protestant settlers, any history 
of the rebellion could be considered whitewashed without discussion of the murders that took 
place.  The frequency of murders during the rebellion is surely the hardest thing to gauge in 
the entire episode and probably why many historians have skirted the issue.  Murders of 
Protestants by Catholics, often graphically depicted, were the chief tool used by English 
commentators to paint the Catholic rebels as little more than bloodthirsty religious warriors.  
Most of the literature which circulated in England in 1642-3 portrayed the rebellion as an 
extension of the continental Thirty Years’ War, with the rebels’ chief goal being the 
extermination of Protestantism – both in Ireland and the British Isles in general.114  Most 
English readers believed these accounts of the rebellion—the vast majority of which were 
written by Englishmen who had not even been to Ireland—confirming to many Englishmen 
that the Irish, and Catholics in general, massacred Protestants out of an innate bloodlust.115  
This general paranoia, as Joseph Cope has shown, manifested itself in all sorts of ways in 
England.  Certain stories told in pamphlets were consistent with—at times even borrowed 
directly from—reports from France and the German states of massacres of Protestants.  The 
rebellion was often seen by Englishmen as part of a wider, Catholic-engineered plot against 
Protestantism and England; even MPs in the House of Commons wondered aloud from where 
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the next step in the great “Papist offensive” against England would come.  Coastal cities like 
Bristol, where the majority of Protestant refugees from Munster landed, were legitimately 
worried over the impending Catholic invasion from Ireland which would be aided by the local 
Catholic recusants.  So prevalent was hysterical paranoia in these cities that the refugees were 
held in suspicion; denizens feared the sheer number of refugees arriving from Ireland would 
not only overwhelm the local economy, but mask Catholic agents who purportedly blended in 
in an attempt to infiltrate England.116  
 With fears of Catholics so rampant in England, at levels higher than even the usual 
hysterical responses by seventeenth-century English Protestants, it comes as little surprise that 
the authenticity of estimates like Robert Maxwell’s 154,000 Protestant civilian casualties were 
readily accepted.  Furthermore, these attitudes among English Protestants are the reason why 
murder numbers during the rebellion are nearly impossible to calculate; any murder by Catholics 
would have been reported by a deponent as a fact whether they witnessed it or not.  Second-hand 
accounts of murders, however, cannot be immediately disregarded.  Sometimes these reported 
murders are corroborated in other depositions by eyewitnesses, while others are surely invented, 
the result of a deponent relaying one or more of the wild rumors which circulated in the 
countryside during the chaos of the early rebellion.  A good example of this in county Kerry is 
the deposition of William Dethick.  It is clear, from the scope and nature of the deposition, that 
most of Dethick’s account is pieced together from secondary and tertiary sources; Dethick 
himself admits at one point “this the deponent saw not with his own eyes, but he dares vouch 
truth for it, because he has heard it most confidently from the many mouths of Protestants, which 
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are of good credit.”117  According to Dethick, Thomas Stack, a Protestant freeholder, was 
working in his potato field around Christmas 1642, when he was accosted by four or five rebels 
who brutally murdered him and threw his body into the river.  Earlier in 1642, Dethick claims 
that after the battle of Newtown, the McCartys rode into Killarney and rounded up sixteen “many 
old and decrepit” Protestant men, women and children.  These unfortunate souls were stripped, 
“whipped up and down the town from one end to the other,” then promptly marched to a large 
hole where all sixteen were buried alive.118  Neither of these stories is corroborated anywhere 
else in the Kerry depositions and both are prime examples of not just the false rumor common in 
Ireland at the time, but also the type of stories which fueled the pamphlets that circulating 
England.  Despite these radical (and to be frank, rather ridiculous) stories, Dethick does provide 
a seemingly otherwise accurate account of the events at the siege of Tralee Castle.   
 Herein lies the paradox of attempting to estimate the number of murders that took place 
anywhere in Ireland during the rebellion; the willingness of some Protestant deponents to report 
any incident which came to mind, while serving its purpose in the contemporary literature, 
undermines any attempt at estimation by modern historians.  This is why even the most learned 
historians can only make guesses based loosely on population estimates and why attempts to 
garner exact numbers are misguided.119    
 For these reasons, both here and later for counties Clare and Limerick, I will not attempt 
to ascertain any figures of the dead.  When considering how little we know of the populations of 
these remote counties, any attempts at a scholarly estimate would be little more than a guess.  
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What then, can we discover from the murders recorded by the Kerry deponents?  First, contrary 
to the contemporary literature of the time, murder was generally avoided by Sugan’s force and 
the rebels in general.  Murder was often the result of clashes between rebels and Protestant 
settlers who were not willing to surrender their possessions and property peacefully.  We have 
accounts of several, perhaps as many as a dozen, Protestants who were murdered outside of 
Tralee Castle during the siege.  Little is known about these murders other than that they 
occurred.  These may have been the result of Protestants attempting to escape the siege who were 
caught, or men who were attempting to break the siege.120  Margaret Percy’s husband and two 
sons were murdered by Sugan’s men when they resisted the robbery of their cattle and goods on 
their farm.121  The most detailed stories and estimates of murders come from deponents whose 
information, as explained above, can be largely discounted.  When considering only the accounts 
of murder in county Kerry that are either corroborated, related by eyewitnesses, or simply 
described in a less sensationalist manner, it is clear that the wanton murder of Protestants was not 
the goal of Capt. Sugan’s rebel forces in Kerry.  This does not mean that the rebels were opposed 
to murder like it appears most Catholic priests were; if Protestant resistance, especially armed 
resistance, was encountered by rebel forces then murder was the most often used recourse.  
Indeed, if Protestants were willing to surrender their property, strongholds, goods, and often their 
clothes, then they were generally allowed to remain physically unharmed, though often 
encouraged to seek passage back to England where Protestantism could not influence the new, 
Catholic Ireland. 
 The other major occurrence, which has already been discussed in passing as a part of the 
stripping and murders, is robbery.  Indeed, the robbery of deponents is universal; every single 
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deponent in county Kerry relates what they were robbed of.  Not only were all of the deponents 
robbed, but nearly all of them were robbed of just about everything they possessed.  Cattle, 
horses, and other livestock were the most common items taken, most likely used to either feed or 
arm the rebel forces.  Many deponents also provide long lists of the goods and other sources of 
wealth that were either physically or figuratively taken from them.  A long account was provided 
by Henry Gibbon: 
Henry Gibbon…since or about, the tenth day of December last past, he was lost 
and forcibly despoiled of his goods and chattels to the several values following, 
603 pounds, 17 shillings.  Of his horses, mares, colts, and one ox…of 
merchantable wares, tobacco, hides, tallow and beef…of his book of accounts, 
bills bonds and other writings were taken away by McFynnen and his brother 
Florence [Capt. Sugan]…of his building, an iron works, in the river of 
Kenmare…of his interest in his part of the lease of the iron works…of debt due to 
the deponent for overseeing the ironworks.  The sum of thirty pounds being due 
upon McFynnen, and Daniel O’Sullivan Esquires both now in actual rebellion.122 
 
Gibbon’s account is typical.  Most deponents, even before recounting their own personal 
experiences or the rumors they have heard about Catholic atrocities, are quick to enumerate—
down to the shilling—the exact amount of economic losses they incurred because of the 
rebellion.  Robberies, as can be seen in the list provided by Gibbon, were not restricted to the 
items the rebels could use.  “Merchantable wares” were also taken, presumably for either resale 
by whichever rebel pillaged the goods or for personal use.  Many deponents report having their 
personal goods taken by both rebels acting individually and as part of Sugan’s larger band of 
men.  Robert Sharde had his hats and hatbands taken, along with his book of accounts.123  John 
Loe’s boat and fishing nets were taken from him by rebels as well as all of his “household 
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stuff.”124  Elizabeth Harris complained of having her family’s expensive plates and jewels taken 
by the rebels, and Margery Blackwell told the deposition takers that all of her linen, woolen, 
brass and pewter household wares were stolen.125  Robberies, much like the stripping of the 
Protestant settlers, were ubiquitous.  The settlers had all of their goods taken, whether they could 
be feasibly used in the war effort or not.  Many of the robberies, it seems, while originally 
intending to gather supplies and arms for Sugan’s army, quickly deteriorated into indiscriminate 
pillaging. 
Most deponents were also quick to point out the land or leases they lost.  Often, the 
Protestant settlers were not physically forced off their land.  As was the case with Henry 
Gibbon’s iron works on the Kenmare River in southern Kerry, most deponents considered the 
loss of the usage and/or profit from a lease or farm considerable enough to be delineated and its 
potential revenue estimated and included in the list of the deponent’s losses.  Many of these lost 
properties were abandoned by settlers fleeing local rebel forces to take refuge in castles or seek 
passage to England in port cities. 
One of the more perplexing developments prevalent in county Kerry is the considerable 
evidence of Protestant turncoats.  John Abraham and his fellow deponents from Ballycarty Castle 
claimed to have been told incorrectly by Robert Blenerhassett that a deal for the safety and 
livelihood of the castle’s Protestant warders had been struck and that John Blenerhasset 
repeatedly aided the rebels in their attempts to gain control of the countryside:126 
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for that the said Robert Hasset, confessed to one of these deponents, Nicholas 
Roberts, and others, that the truth was that he had made no quarter at all, but 
referred him and all the English ward to Mr. Florence MacCarty’s [Capt. Sugan] 
own breast.  They also say that without any consent or fore knowledge of any of 
the warders, when the castle was to be yielded up the said Robert Hasset called up 
unto him all the warders, and caused them all to be disarmed, of those arms, who 
were of their own proper goods, and so they were delivered up to the Irish ward, 
himself being permitted to live within the Castle among the Irish…also they say 
that in Captain John Hasset’s house that was situated within the Barn of the said 
Castle, they have often served dinners of the prime Rebbells of that country to 
come in and out, and eat and drink and be merry; also Florence MacCarty about 
the latter end of August last Came to Captain John Hasset’s house within the said 
Barn and Lay there one night and so went away again [the] next morning, the said 
Florence being then a prime man at the siege of Tralee the said Capt John Hasset 
was often seen to parlay with divers of the rebels, and letters past to and fro 
betwixt them.127 
 
Indeed, the Blenerhassets, though being English Protestant settlers, were often implicated as 
acting in concert with Sugan’s rebel force in county Kerry.  Josias White, who was robbed and 
driven from his house near Ballycarty, claimed that he often saw Robert Blenerhasset grinding 
corn for the rebels.128  Oddly enough, we do have a deposition from a member of the 
Blenerhasset family: Arthur.  The account, however, is entirely second-hand stories of the siege 
at Tralee Castle and clashes between English forces and Lord Muskerry’s force in county Cork.  
It seems likely that despite leaving a deposition, Arthur participated in his brothers’ duplicity.  
Perhaps most damning is that the deposition is the only account from county Kerry which does 
not list the goods and animals the deponent lost during the rebellion. 
 It was not only the Blenerhasset family that aided the rebels and/or switched allegiances 
entirely; Abraham alone names more than a dozen men and families of county Kerry that had 
become Catholic.  John Williams, a Protestant warder of Tralee Castle, joined Sugan’s rebel 
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force soon after the castle was given up.129  Gregory Dickeson names five Protestant men who 
had “turned papist” since the beginning of the rebellion, forcing conversion upon their wives and 
families as well.  John Crosby, a gentleman freeholder, talked openly with the rebels and gave 
food and drink to any rebels who “came within a bow shot of [his] land.”130  Perhaps the most 
astonishing of these is John O’Connor who, despite having a typically Irish last name, was 
purportedly a Protestant minister prior to the outbreak of rebellion.131  The list of men and 
women who reportedly converted or reverted to Catholicism is surprisingly long in a sparsely 
populated county like Kerry; nearly thirty individuals in all are documented in the depositions, 
and several deponents claim in addition to those they named that many more in the county also 
converted.   
 Perhaps the most interesting case comes from Edward Vauclier, a self-proclaimed British 
Protestant gentleman from Tralee. Vauclier provides a harrowing account of his experience.  
After being driven from his home in Tralee, he took refuge in Tralee Castle, where he assumed a 
leadership role amongst the Protestant warders.  Later, he and two others attempted to escape in 
the summer of 1642.  In doing so, he received fourteen wounds from rebel swords, and was shot 
once in the right shoulder.  He saved himself by jumping from a nearby rock into the river and 
swimming a mile downstream.132   
 However, Daniel Spratt, a fellow warder of Tralee Castle, gives a very different account 
of Vauclier’s actions.  Vauclier, Spratt claims, was a rebel double agent of sorts.  Vauclier, as a 
principal gentleman of the town of Tralee, was well-respected by the local community and 
subsequently the warders of the castle.  In February, according to Spratt, before the castle had 
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been besieged for a month, Vauclier rode to the gate of the castle and unsuccessfully attempted 
to convince the warders to give themselves over to the rebel forces.  Afterwards, rather than 
taking up in the castle with the other warders as Vauclier claimed, Vauclier instead sent for his 
wife, who herself was taking refuge in Tralee Castle, and led her out.  Furthermore, Spratt 
claimed that by the end of the siege when all of the deponents had “only quarter for life and one 
suit of clothes a piece…Mr. Vauclier had no less than about eleven horse loads of goods.”133  In 
1642, most Protestants who encountered rebels were robbed of everything; Spratt’s emphasis on 
the sheer volume of goods Vauclier retained serves as yet another implication that he was 
working for the rebels.  Furthermore, Vauclier’s story of harrowing escape seems far-fetched at 
best.  It is far more likely that Vauclier had struck a deal for his family’s and his own livelihood, 
probably under the condition that he attempt to persuade the warders of Tralee Castle to 
surrender; alternatively, as a well-off gentleman, he may have paid the rebels off.  Regardless of 
how Vauclier secured his good standing with the rebels, it is yet another account of Protestants in 
county Kerry joining, or acting in concert with, the Catholic rebel forces.  This suggests that in 
the dynamic landscape of Protestants and Catholics, English and Irish, confessional allegiance or 
ethnic identity may have become more muddled by the beginning of the rebellion than has been 
previously assumed.  At the very least, it shows the opportunistic nature of most settlers.  
Vauclier, after all, was an English Protestant of good standing in Tralee; his willingness to work 
with the rebels whose goal was the creation of an officially Catholic state apparatus in Ireland is 
surprising.  As the Blenerhassets and other stories show, Protestants were not only willing to 
work with the rebels, but convert or revert to Catholicism.  This suggests several things about the 
nature of seventeenth-century Irish society, and perhaps British religious awareness as well.   
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 First, it suggests that that Irish society, at the community level, was less intensely 
religious, or, at the very least, less fervent in the adherence to the differences of Catholicism and 
Anglican beliefs.  At this point in Ireland, where Catholics and Protestants had coexisted for 
nearly a century, confessional identification may have been merely a classification, a way to 
identify one’s political allegiances instead of a matter of faith.  Rather than caring about whether 
one’s neighbor believed in transubstantiation, identifying someone as Catholic meant that they 
recognized the Pope’s political authority—and likewise the right to determine religious 
doctrine—rather than the King’s.  Political, temporal allegiances are notoriously far more 
flexible than religious and spiritual convictions.  The plentiful evidence of Protestants willing to 
change sides suggests that, in county Kerry at least, matters of religious doctrine were most 
likely relatively unimportant; if converting—or pretending to convert—was what saved a British 
settler’s family and livelihood, then they could live with consuming a few transubstantiated 
Eucharists.   
 County Kerry was, in many ways, a unique province.  One of the more isolated 
provinces, with very few British settlers, it may be most surprising that even sixty some odd 
depositions survive at all.  The evidence that we do have portrays a dynamic relationship 
between settler and native Irish Catholic.  The fact that very few British Protestant settlers lived 
in the county may have provided the impetus for so many to be willing to work with the 
marauding Irishmen.  Unlike in Ulster and eastern Leinster, the Irish rebels operated in a 
somewhat orderly and humane fashion.  Most of the robberies and both castle sieges were 
conducted by Capt. Sugan or members of his force.  It comes as no surprise then, that Stephen 
Love tells us that it was Sugan who brought the laws from the Confederation of Kilkenny to 
Kerry in November 1642, enacted a county council, and provided instructions for Kerry’s 
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gentleman and clergy to send men to the National Assembly.134  Furthermore, Sugan and other 
Irish rebels began their operations far sooner than other historians have surmised.  By December, 
Kerry experienced its first robberies and attacks, and by January Sugan had assembled a rude 
force with which he began to quell what few Protestant strongholds existed in the county.  The 
differences between county Kerry and its neighboring counties’ experience will become evident 
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3 COUNTY CLARE 
The only county in Munster west of the river Shannon, Clare is bordered by Limerick to 
the south and east across the river and its only landed connection to the Irish isle is along its 
northern border with Galway.  In the northeast Lough Derg marks Clare’s boundary, before the 
Shannon continues, headed south along Clare’s eastern border.  As the Shannon divides both the 
city and county of Limerick from Clare in the southeastern corner, it widens into a broad estuary, 
which separates central and western Clare from counties Limerick and Kerry, respectively.  
Surrounded by water on three sides, county Clare was and continues to be one of Ireland’s most 
isolated areas.  Edward MacLysaght, in his 1950 history of seventeenth-century Irish culture, 
remarked that Clare was “admittedly an inaccessible region” and that “in the first decade of the 
twentieth [century], many people…had never seen a motor car or even a railway train.  There 
was, in fact, no really essential difference between the daily life which I remember there as a boy 
and that of the seventeenth century.”135   
It comes as little surprise, then, that Clare’s rebellion is unique among the three counties 
in this study.  For starters, Clare was the only of the three counties in this study with a single 
family who controlled most of the entire county.  The O’Briens had been Kings of Thomond (a 
common name for an area with roughly the same borders as present-day county Clare; in the 
seventeenth century the two names were used interchangeably) since even before the twelfth-
century Norman conquest.  Not only were the O’Briens the sole landowners in the county, many 
family members, especially the patriarch, were converted Protestants.  In 1543, Murrough 
O’Brien was attracted to an alliance with the English crown through the surrender and regrant 
policy, accepting the title Earl of Thomond, and the family later converted to Protestantism and 
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adopted Anglicized customs and dress in order to curry even more favor with the English 
crown’s administration in Dublin.136   
These developments meant that the O’Brien lands in county Clare were largely secured 
and safe from any proposed plantation of Munster.  Donogh O’Brien, the fourth Earl of 
Thomond, was continually trying to garner more income from his lands in Clare, and early in the 
seventeenth century he even began purchasing lands across the Shannon in Limerick.  In 
addition, the O’Briens had planted several English and Dutch Protestant farming and artisanal 
families in the county, forcing off Irish Catholic families who could not afford the higher rents.  
Furthermore, these settlers the O’Brien family recruited often brought with them other families 
eager for new farmland in western Ireland.137  Despite this, it should be noted, the county was 
still overwhelmingly Irish and Catholic in its makeup – certainly more so than either Limerick or 
Kerry. 
This unique situation created a distinctive response to, and experience of, the rebellion.  
Unlike in Kerry or Limerick where local leaders, often Catholic, joined the rebellion, the 
rebellion was openly resisted by the sole authority in the county, Murrough O’Brien, the sixth 
Earl of Thomond.  O’Brien, who soon became Lord Inchiquin, played a key role as the chief 
commander of Royalist forces in Munster until he declared for Parliament in 1644.  In his own 
holdings in Clare, Inchiquin did his utmost to protect his settlers and their goods, opening the 
doors to his own castles for refuge.  He often attempted to act as a mediating influence in his 
lands, rather than being complicit in the violence perpetrated by his kinsmen.  When four 
hundred English and Dutch settlers of the area planned an armed resistance to the insurrection, 
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Inchiquin enjoined them not to, saying “that course would further provoke and incense the Irish 
to anger than otherwise.”  During the siege of Limerick Castle in May 1642, Inchiquin again 
endeavored to mollify tensions between the rebels and the besieged Protestants within.  Inchiquin 
attempted to persuade the Protestants within the castle to not attempt any bold, military action 
against the rebels.138  Such action would have been folly, as there were mostly laymen, women 
and children inside the castle, and by the spring of 1642 the rebel forces in the area had 
organized themselves.  Perhaps the best account of Inchiquin’s actions describes an episode after 
the fall of Castle Clare, when “the right honorable” Inchiquin confronted his Catholic brother 
Dermod O’Brien at Bunratty in front of John Smith, asking him “why they did commit such 
rebellious and outrageous actions against the king’s subjects?”139 
It is rather surprising that the most common name associated with rebel actions in Clare 
is O’Brien.  Indeed, Inchiquin’s brothers and cousins were undoubtedly leaders of the 
insurrection in county Clare – Dermod, Daniel, and Turlough being the most commonly named.  
The McNamara family is accused of perpetrating robberies and violence nearly as much as the 
non-titled O’Briens, though it is unclear whether they gathered forces with the O’Briens or acted 
of their own accord.  How could it be then, that the rest of the O’Brien clan led a county-wide 
rebellion that the most powerful member of the family took no part of?  This question requires 
further research into the seventeenth-century O’Brien clan, an area the depositions do not shed 
much light on, though John Smith and others give evidence of numerous public arguments 
between the Earl and some his relatives during the rebellion.   
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This familial division is most likely in part due to the nature of the O’Brien family’s 
anglicization and conversion to Protestantism; it was a political decision, one made to maintain 
the security of O’Brien land and garner more influence with the English government.  However, 
the political advantages of adopting the reformed faith might not have carried any weight with 
the personal religious leanings of the O’Briens.  Despite their publicly Protestant associations, 
the O’Briens did not “impose their beliefs upon their tenants, or hinder the missionary endeavors 
of the Counter-Reformation clergy who worked within their lordship.”  Indeed, “there was no 
knowing what the disposition of the family towards Catholicism or Gaelic culture might be in the 
future.”140  Therefore, other than the British and Dutch settlers that Inchiquin brought into the 
county, the rest of the population was entirely Irish Catholic.  In fact, there is evidence that local 
proprietors in Clare attempted to remain aloof and protect only their lands from the Irish, similar 
to the actions taken by many communities after the outbreak of war in England.  Unfortunately, 
those Catholics and Protestants who attempted this were soon swept up in the rebellion, for better 
or worse respectively, by the sheer number of the county’s Irish Catholics committed to the rebel 
cause.141  
Despite concerted efforts made by Inchiquin to protect his Protestant tenants and their 
goods, several deponents believe the Earl acted subversively. Edmund Mainwaring claimed, 
admittedly with second-hand evidence, “since taking the castle and before [Inchiquin] 
entertained with meat, drink, and lodging the said besiegers.”142  At the beginning of the 
rebellion, according to Mainwaring, Inchiquin appointed Dermod O’Brien, Connor O’Brien, and 
Donogh McNamara among others to be “Captains and Commanders within the county,” adding 
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that he “pretended [it was] for the good of the County.”143  Many of these sentiments probably 
arose because Inchiquin was the only O’Brien who did not revert to Catholicism and rebel.  
Furthermore, Inchiquin’s own kinsmen most likely used their familial connections to further 
their own goals.  Dermod O’Brien, when disarming and robbing Urias Reade, told him it was 
“by virtue of a warrant from the Earl of Thomond.”144  Two other tenants maintain his 
complicity in the rebellion or, at the very least, his indifference.  However, given the Earl’s vast 
holdings of land in county Clare it seems counterintuitive that he would attack his own tenants.  
In the shortest of depositions where only a date, a list of the land and goods the deponent was 
deprived of, and the recognizable attackers are named, Thomond’s name is never included.  
Furthermore, the evidence given in the depositions claiming Thomond acted in concert with the 
rebels is either hearsay or based on the judgment of the deponent alone, who himself would most 
likely have been resentful of his landlord’s untouched belongings while his own were plundered. 
The fact that Inchiquin did not convert to Catholicism and eventually became the chief 
commander of British forces in Munster did not stop the actions of his kinsmen.  As the 
argument witnessed by John Smith suggests, the rest of the O’Brien clan cared little about the 
allegiances of their patriarch.  Indeed, although we know that the Earl and his family had been 
Protestant since the late sixteenth century, we have no information on the confessional 
affiliations of any other O’Brien.  As even the Earl himself did little to suppress Catholicism in 
his domains, it is probable that he did not force Protestantism upon his kinsmen.  Even if they 
had outwardly converted, his kinsmen most likely retained Catholic practices and beliefs, and 
possibly even attended Catholic mass which was still openly held in the county.   
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Regardless of whether these O’Briens had reverted to Catholicism or remained Catholic 
all along, they were doubtlessly the leaders of the Catholic rebellion in Clare.  Dermod, 
Turlough, Donnell, Daniel, Connor, Donogh are all named often by deponents as their chief 
attackers, or the leaders of the agents of rebellion who had accosted them.  John McNamara is 
also frequently named, at times along with a member of the O’Brien clan but also often on his 
own.  John Meale’s family, for instance, was stripped and robbed in the middle of the night, 12 
December 1641, by an estimated 200 men under the command of McNamara and Jeffrey 
Burke.145  Meale’s three children later perished due to the cold, and he also names nearly a dozen 
neighbors who were robbed by McNamara and Burke’s force.  Juiane Pitch also recounted how 
her goods and clothes were taken from them by John McNamara; her husband William and her 
children were physically assaulted in the process.  William Pitch died soon after.146  Regardless 
of these seemingly isolated attacks, McNamara’s forces likely acted in concert with the forces 
led by the various O’Briens, even if they were originally conceived separately.  McNamara is 
often named as one of the chief attackers at Ballyally, Banck, and Limerick Castles.  The 
individual attacks perpetrated only by the McNamara force were probably either raids foraging 
for supplies for the larger force or occurred, as in Meale’s account, before a larger county-wide 
force had been consolidated. 
As in Kerry, direct connections to the wider rebellion are not present.  However, the 
justification given by various rebels for insurrection and their actual conduct is enough reason to 
assume that the larger forces of rebels in Clare—the O’Briens especially—had contact and were 
acting in concert with the wider, Ulster-begun rebellion.  Despite their claims of Irish atrocities, 
many Protestants personally were often unharmed if they were lucky enough to be attacked by 
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rebel forces led by the O’Briens.  Mary Young, for instance, admits that when Limerick Castle 
was surrendered all of the English inside were given quarter.147  Giving quarter to English 
Protestants was practiced by Phelim O’Neill’s forces in Ulster, and most depositions in Armagh 
claim Protestants went unharmed, by O’Neill’s order, until after the Irish were defeated at 
Lisnegarvey in late November, 1641.  Moreover, as elsewhere in Munster the several hundred 
rebels led by the O’Briens throughout the county often attacked castles, fortified positions that 
would have been ignored if their insurrection had simply been a popular revolt.  While there is 
no explicit evidence linking the rebellions in Clare and Ulster, the nature of the rebellious 
assaults led by the O’Briens in Clare and their motives for rising are indicative of their 
connections to the wider rebellion, begun in Ulster.     
In addition to their actions, the sentiments and statements of Clare’s most important 
rebels echo those of O’Neill’s Ulster rising.  Similar cries of rebelling in the King’s name or with 
his commission are recounted by all the deponents who encounter rebels affiliated with the 
O’Briens’ larger army: William Chambers who was held captive for eight days with the 
Graneere family by a group of rebels was told by Teige O’Brien that the rebels had the King’s 
seal to approve any rebellious actions; Dermod O’Brien reportedly told Inchiquin that the rebels 
did not have to justify themselves as their actions were by the King’s direction; even Mary 
Dannter was told by the rebels who accosted her family that the King was a frequent mass-
goer.148  Furthermore, near the beginning of the siege at Ballyally Castle, one of the rebels 
approached the castle walls, telling the Protestants within that “[for] what they did they had a 
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warrant from Sir Phelim O’Neill & likewise to banish all the Protestants out of the kingdom.”149  
Though they most likely did not have any such document, for Sir Phelim O’Neill’s original 
intentions were not to harm any Protestants within the country, it shows that even a minor rebel 
in the O’Briens’ force was cognizant of the Ulster rising and later, once Ballyally was 
surrendered to the rebels, Dermod O’Brien exclaimed to the defeated refugees that “what they 
did was by directions from his majesty.”150 Perhaps the most representative of the rebels’ own 
belief in these justifications comes from Urias Reade, who was told by Christopher O’Brien that 
the rebels had Charles I’s commission for the insurrection “which if I had not certainly known 
(quote he) I would never join with them.”151  
That these justifications were often connected to the King’s fraudulent seal (or his 
direction or actions), which Phelim O’Neill presented in order to legitimize the rebellion, is 
reason enough to assume the larger forces present in Clare were connected with the rebellion.  
Though, possibly due to its isolation and certainly due to the rumors present everywhere in 
Ireland, Clare also exhibited some of the more colorful stories of rebel ideas about the rebellion’s 
designs and its legitimacy.  Donnell O’Brien, who imprisoned the Graneere family, was 
apparently unaware of Irish claims for legitimacy under the British monarch when he cut a deal 
with the family concerning their livestock: 
Sir Donnell replying…my command was not to sell them or to make them away 
& adding further quote he if ever the King of England recover the kingdom of 
Ireland, the Englishman [Graneere] will have his cows again by law but if the 
king of Ireland & the gentry of this same kingdom maintain the same, keep the 
kingdom, be sure you will be answerable for the said cows towards the 
maintenance of the Irish, our army. 
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Obviously, Donnell O’Brien’s account is rife with factual and theoretical inaccuracies which 
make his own personal view of the rebellion’s legitimacy hard to grasp: is he speaking of only 
Charles I or is he insinuating Ireland has an altogether different King?  Has Charles shed his title 
of King of England to become the Catholic King of Ireland?  A definite understanding from this 
short account is impossible, but it is indicative of the complicated—and at times perverse—
justification which had permeated the ranks of the rebel forces.  Others blamed Charles I rather 
than claiming his approval; the rebels who robbed Francis Haselope told him that the rebellion 
was the King’s fault, by “setting such mean & base governors to rule over” the Irish, naming 
specifically Sir William Parsons and Sir Richard Bolton.152  Thomas Rountree had perhaps the 
least substantiated story explained to him by John McNamara: the Queen had come to Ireland 
with Charles I’s second son James, Duke of York, , in order to crown him as the Catholic King 
of Ireland, and it was for their cause that the rebels had risen.153  While this array of reasons 
given by lesser rebels portrays how disorganized the countryside became (something that will be 
addressed later), the more common reasons given by forces led by the O’Briens—and their 
targeting of castles and other Protestant strongholds—is reason enough to assume their affiliation 
with the wider rebellion. 
 The size of O’Brien’s force itself is harder to grasp than forces in other counties.  Unlike 
in Kerry or Limerick, few deponents encountered the main rebel force as a whole; most 
encountered bands of 60-100 men led by the various members of the O’Briens who robbed and 
stripped the deponents.  Indeed, the only time the force seems to have been together during the 
early stages of the rebellion was at the siege of Ballyally Castle, and even then a large amount of 
the rebel force dispersed in the middle of the siege, moving to Limerick where the siege of 
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Limerick Castle was having greater success. 154  Those few depositions that do provide an 
estimate put the rebel numbers around 1,000.  This is probably an overestimate, a benchmark 
number serving to portray that the O’Briens commanded far more than 100 or 200 soldiers.  The 
actual force was probably closer to 600-700.  Despite Clare’s isolation and low population 
density, this force—more than double what Sugan commanded in Kerry—is not all that 
surprising; aside from what few settlers the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Earls of 
Thomond had enticed to settle in Clare, the county was still overwhelmingly Irish Catholic.   
The lone siege in the county that is detailed well and by multiple deponents took place at 
Ballyally Castle.  Many of the deponents in the Clare depositions were some of the 100-150 men, 
women, and children who took shelter in the castle and were subsequently besieged for several 
months.155  All of the major members of the O’Brien family mentioned above are named as the 
chief attackers, along with several members of the McNamara family and other lesser rebels.156  
Many Protestants fled to the castle after order in the county had broken down and after many had 
been robbed—whether by O’Brien-led forces or individual Irishmen—of their household goods 
and animals.  They were besieged soon after, and by 4 February the main force of rebels arrived, 
“with colors flying in a hostile & rebellious manner.”157  The siege proceeded in multiple stages.  
Near the end of February a group of thirty Protestants armed themselves and attempted to break 
the siege.  Sallying forth from the front gates, the much smaller force of Protestants attacked the 
rebel camp while the vast majority of the Irish force was observing Catholic mass, killing 
approximately thirty rebels while only losing a handful of their own.158  However, the guerilla 
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operation was doomed to failure, and the Protestants retreated back inside the castle once the 
alarm had been raised in the rebel camp.   
After that incident, a large portion of the rebel force departed to aid in the siege at 
Limerick. 159  The smaller remaining force “built a fort and divers trenches” and prepared to 
continue the siege indefinitely.160  After Castle Limerick fell in early June 1642, the force that 
had left after the Protestant sallying force returned, with cannon from the siege at Limerick in 
tow.  With this they fired multiple shots against the castle walls.  The rude cannon had little 
effect on the sturdy walls of the castle, and, as at Tralee in Kerry, they only fired perhaps a dozen 
shots.161  The “second siege,” as most of the deponents term the return of the large O’Brien-led 
force, continued for several weeks after the Irish artillery fire.162   
As spring and summer wore on, the situation for the Protestants inside the castle became 
dire.  Unable to leave the castle to collect fresh water or firewood, the Protestants “were driven 
to that extremity and want of victuals that they were glad to eat the flesh of horses, dogs and also 
to feed upon nettles docks & other weeds.”163  Indeed, at least thirty of the original refugees 
perished during the siege, mainly the elderly and small children.164  Several, like Beatrice 
Hepditch, left their remaining belongings in the castle and escaped through breaks in the siege 
lines to look for shelter in the Irish countryside.165  When the castle finally did surrender around 
the middle of September 1642, the Protestants were treated by the O’Brien-led army in similar 
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fashion to those who surrendered to Sugan in Kerry.166  Their goods were stolen from them, but 
no additional harm came to any of the Protestants who had managed to survive the siege. 
The siege at Ballyally Castle and its result reveal just how organized the rebellious 
O’Briens were; they managed to control a large force of approximately 700 Irish rebels.  Though 
the makeup of this army is not revealed by the depositions, as elsewhere the rebels likely had 
little regular, martial experience.  Moreover, the O’Briens’ forces were sustaining multiple sieges 
at the same time.  Their ability to leave a minor force at the siege at Ballyally and go with the 
majority of their troops to aid the siege at Limerick for an extended period of time, without 
lifting the first siege, speaks to a well-organized and disciplined militia – something not often 
attributed to rebel forces early in the rebellion outside of those organized by Phelim O’Neill in 
Ulster.  The artillery, if only a couple of rude and ill-equipped cannon that were moved around 
the countryside by O’Briens’ forces, indicate that the rebel forces under the control of the 
O’Briens resembled an army more than a rag-tag group of rebels. 
Furthermore, the treatment of the Protestants by O’Brien-led forces was not necessarily 
violent.  This was not always the case, for some Protestants died at the hands of the O’Brien 
force; Urias Reade recounts how at the siege of Ballyally on 6 August 1642 several of the 
castle’s caretakers who had fallen into rebel hands were barbarously murdered and their bodies 
were “never suffered to be buried until the dogs & crows did pick & eat up their carcasses.”167  
Despite these isolated incidents, the attacks on Protestants by the O’Briens and their forces were 
not intended to be violent, whether or not they became so.  All of the rebels in the depositions 
were robbing Protestants; the difference in Clare lies in that the O’Briens’ rebels appropriated 
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Protestant goods for the use of their army.168  Indeed, as Beatrice Hepditch’s account hints at, the 
entire reason the Protestants were besieged at Ballyally Castle was because they were not willing 
to give up their goods.  Once she and several others resolved to leave their things behind, her 
account suggests it took little effort to leave the castle without interference from the besieging 
rebels.169  John Hawkins was told by Thomas Chamberlain, a corporal in the rebel army, “that 
they (meaning the English) should carry no part of their goods away but must be seized upon & 
kept for the maintenance of the kings army (meaning themselves).”170  While resistance to these 
seizures resulted in minor skirmishes and at times the deaths of Protestants, it was not the 
intention of these forces to kill English Protestants.  Appropriation of goods for the use of the 
rebel forces, not wanton killing of Protestants, was the reason the O’Brien armies accosted the 
inhabitants.    
Every accosted Protestant in the depositions begins his or her account by listing the items 
that the rebels stole from them, usually including livestock, crops, household wares, clothing, 
and at times arms and ammunition.  Most deponents also include their land, which they were 
either forced off or fled from, and the debts owed to them, whether by Irishmen who had joined 
the rebellion or by men who had lost their lives in the unrest.  Maximillian Graneere, for 
example, claimed to be “desperate by reason that the debtors partly are murdered by the 
Rebels.”171   
Many of the deponents’ debtors were Irishmen.  This was due in large part to the 
plantation schemes which had supplanted many Irish farmers.  Many were forced to migrate to 
cities and become wage laborers or participate in various proto-industries, such as the ironworks 
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owned by Henry Gibbon related in the second chapter.  Those who remained in their local area 
were forced to become tenant farmers to the new, English landowners, paying rents that were 
often double or triple what they had paid previously.  These farmers would have also been 
affected by the bad harvests that struck all of Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.  
As rents rose and yields diminished, farmers were forced to borrow not only money to buy 
necessities like food and clothing, but draught animals to complete their harvests.  Even Irish 
Catholic nobles had become increasingly impoverished.  In 1637, Dermot McFyneen Carty was 
forced to mortgage his vast properties to the Earl of Cork in exchange for a cash loan.  When it 
became evident that Carty had no intention of paying Cork back, he rented the property out 
exclusively to Protestants rather than the Irish tenants Carty had maintained.172  While this heavy 
indebtedness among the Irish population did not spark the rebellion per se, it certainly created a 
disgruntled, underprivileged majority with an interest in upending the establishment.  Irishmen 
had been increasingly disinherited as the English had begun planting Protestants more directly; 
they had no vested interest in maintaining any semblance of authority.  Furthermore, as 
plantation policies had created a much larger indigent population than had previously existed in 
Ireland, there were more men available who would have been willing to rebel.  These factors 
certainly swelled the ranks of rebel forces, and may account for the large force that quickly 
assembled in a county as sparsely populated as Clare. 
It should be noted that the picture painted of the rebels in Clare so far is strictly in 
reference to those under the command of the main rebellious force led by the O’Brien clan.  
Indeed, the popular insurrection against Protestants, apart from the main rebel force, was far 
more violent and destructive in Clare than in either Kerry or Limerick.  Looting by individuals or 
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small bands of Irish often turned violent.  Peeter Belson recounts how members of the 
O’Flaherty family from Connacht stole all his goods and those of Peter Ward, before killing 
Ward, his wife and his son.173  Thomas Mayden, himself stripped and robbed by rebels under 
Daniel O’Brien’s agency, could not name any of the various men who had murdered his English 
neighbors though they must surely have been common Irish Catholics.174  William Culliver’s 
mother and daughter were beaten by several local rebels, and later died from their injuries.175  
John Cookesson nameed several of his Protestant neighbors who were murdered by John 
McThomas, whose name appears in Cookesson’s deposition alone.  The dichotomy between the 
popular rebellion and the O’Briens’ organized rebellion is best displayed in the deposition of 
Neptune Blood.  Blood himself had his cattle and some of his household goods and arms stolen 
by a band of men led by Hugh O’Hagan and Teige O’Brien.  No physical harm came to him but 
Blood recounts a bevy of murders and their common Irish perpetrators from his surrounding 
area.  The entire Steele family was killed “in a most cruel & barbarous manner” by William oge 
Nellane and James oge Cashy.  Blood’s friends Margery Owens and Michael Hunt were likewise 
killed by other individual Irishmen.176   
The reasons given by the unorganized rebels for rebellion and robbery are also far more 
base and hostile than those given by rebels affiliated with the O’Briens’ force.  Redmond 
Nollane, who appears sparingly in the Clare depositions, claimed “it will never be [again] that 
any Englishmen (meaning the Protestants) shall enjoy a foot of land in this kingdom.”177  Rebels 
such as Nollane and the O’Flahertys were not acting as part of the wider rebellion and they were 
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probably not even interested in the establishment of a Catholic kingdom under the British 
monarch; theirs were simply acts of opportunistic self-interest.   
 The frequency of popular violence in Clare is surprising: Munster is generally believed to 
have experienced relatively little popular violence – at least in comparison to Ulster or Leinster.  
Regardless, its occurrence is most likely due to an important societal dynamic present elsewhere 
in Munster that Clare lacked: the presence of a substantial ethnically and religiously mixed 
community.  Though the Earls of Thomond had imported English and Dutch settlers to the 
county, there had been no confiscation and redistribution of Irish Catholic land; indeed, since the 
Irish Earls of Thomond had participated in the Surrender and Regrant program, as well as 
outwardly converting to Protestantism, Clare remained outside the boundaries of the Munster 
Plantation.  Plantation in Clare was more of a rhetorical possibility than an actual threat, used to 
ensure its principal lord continued to tow the government line.178  This meant that most Irishmen 
of Clare were ignorant of Protestants or English in general.  The opposite was true in Kerry and 
Limerick; where plantation had created significant heterogeneous communities—or, at the very 
least, created common contact between homogenous enclaves—Clare had none.  The softening 
of confessional lines and fervor associated with confessional identification never had the chance 
to take place in Clare. 
What news that reached them of political developments in the previous half-century was 
most likely the product of rumor and hearsay.  While it has been noted how prevalent rumor was 
among the Protestant deponents and how it manifested itself in the accounts of the rebellion they 
have given, it should also be stressed that spurious information and stories were just as prevalent 
on the Irish Catholic side of the conflict.  Moreover, stories of Protestant atrocities during the 
                                                           
178 Canny, Making Ireland British, 495. 
68 
 
unrest or English Protestant usurpation of traditionally Irish land and power would have been 
more readily believed in a county like Clare where few Irish dealt with Protestants on a daily 
basis, if ever. 
Like the images of bloodthirsty Irish Catholics drummed up in England by the likes of 
Temple and others, the rumors spread about the Protestant counterattacks throughout Ireland 
were largely fictional.  They created an ugly caricature of Protestants.  This image could be more 
readily accepted by Irish Catholics in counties like Clare that had little or no interaction with 
actual settlers.  These readily believed stereotypes not only reinforced the residual resentment 
toward English Protestants felt by the Irish Catholics in Clare, it also gave local Catholics in the 
area a symbolic—though distorted—face of Ireland’s Protestant community and concrete 
examples of aggression against the Irish Catholics that needed to be avenged.   
Furthermore, as was evident in the examples of popular violence above, many of these 
encounters were bloody.  If someone in the deponent’s family did not lose their life to an 
opportunistic, lone rebel, then their neighbor or neighbor’s spouse was often brutally beaten or 
hanged.  This wanton violence is in stark contrast to the conduct of the larger force led by the 
O’Briens.  Violence, rather than part and parcel of their attacks on local Protestants, was only a 
threat; it was a tool the rebels could use to extort what they wanted, not an end goal.  This is best 
illustrated during the siege of Ballyally when the leaders of the refugee group within the castle 
walked out to the rebel camp, presumably in an attempt to negotiate an end to the siege.  Instead 
of negotiations, the men were seized and imprisoned.  Gallows were erected within sight of the 
castle walls and rebels threatened to hang the men if Ballyally did not surrender.  When it 
became evident that not only were its warders not going to surrender the castle but that they also 
were not willing to negotiate for the men’s lives, the refugee leaders were simply freed and 
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returned to the castle.179  The violence perpetrated by rebels operating outside the larger rebellion 
occurred not just because they had the opportunity—indeed, the O’Briens could easily have 
executed Ballyally’s best men—but because the widespread caricatures of Protestant settlers had 
dehumanized the Protestants in the county. In Clare, it was far too easy to murder someone who 
was usurping your father’s and kinsmen’s land, political power, and natural rights; in Kerry, 
murder was more difficult because you were often killing a neighbor, a business partner, or 
perhaps even a friend. 
Therefore in Clare, far more than in Kerry or Limerick, we see a marked disconnect 
between the popular rebellion and the rebellion proper.  While Kerry’s experience agrees with 
commonly held notions that Munster saw little or no popular rebellion, as Catholic leaders like 
Sugan, Muskerry, and Barry gained control of the province relatively quickly, Clare presents a 
far different case.  Though certainly not to the same extent as Ulster or eastern Leinster, county 
Clare experienced a popular rebellion which has previously been undocumented.  This popular 
uprising occurred in part due to sheer opportunism among a poor, greatly indebted Irish Catholic 
populace to be sure, but also because Clare lacked the interpersonal, interconfessional 
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4 COUNTY LIMERICK 
The third and final county in this study, Limerick, is farther inland than the truly littoral 
counties, Kerry and Clare.  The river Shannon runs through the city of Limerick from east to 
west, opening into a broad estuary west of the city, forming Limerick’s border with Clare before 
emptying into the Atlantic.  Although Kerry borders Limerick to the west, the county is centrally 
located in Munster with Tipperary to the east and Cork to the south.  The county more closely 
resembled its inland neighbors than it did either Kerry or Clare; its farmland was more suitable to 
sustainable agriculture, and its denizens were not subjected to the same harsh weather prevalent 
on the Irish Atlantic coast.  
Ethnically and religiously, Limerick was in a far different situation than Kerry or Clare 
when rebellion broke out in October 1641.  Limerick had a significantly higher concentration of 
residual Protestants left over from the plantation era than either Kerry or Clare.  Large tracts of 
land were owned by the Earl of Cork, some of which he had planted with Protestants.  These 
inland lands were harder to attract settlers to than the coastal south, causing Limerick, despite 
being well-settled with Protestants, to pale in comparison to the heavy settlements around Cork, 
Youghal, Kinsale, and Waterford.  The city of Limerick itself was heavily Protestant, though 
many Old English Catholics still held considerable political sway; the mayor of Limerick was 
either a Catholic or quickly converted to Catholicism after the outbreak of rebellion.180  In 
addition, as in Cork where Protestant settlers tended to cluster around the most fertile farmland 
along the Blackwater, Lee, and Bandon rivers, the densest Protestant settlement occurred along 
the Maguire, west of Limerick itself.  Throughout the rest of the county, British settlement was 
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sparse at best, and Old English Catholics still controlled most of the land directly surrounding 
Limerick itself: “there was a sequence of settler communities dominating particular localities 
rather than a broad-spectrum settler society.”181   
 Limerick was still largely Irish Catholic, though it contained a larger population of Old 
English Catholics than Kerry or Clare.  This is most likely how the rebellion was able to spread 
so quickly throughout Munster; the leadership of Old English Catholics had not been sufficiently 
broken by the Munster plantation.  When Catholic leaders in Limerick and Munster in general 
first heard of a Catholic uprising they rose as well, often being able to gather large Catholic 
forces ready to join the cause.  The force these leaders amassed in Limerick was not only the 
largest of the three counties in this study, but most likely the largest of the province.   
The force, formally led by Colonel Garrett Barry and Donogh MacCarthy, Lord 
Muskerry, was roughly 6,000 strong by August 1642, with some estimates placing it as high as 
7,000.  Garrett Barry was later appointed by the Confederacy as the commander of all Munster 
forces.182  The large number of troops raised in such a short period of time is the result of two 
factors.  First, a radical proclamation by Munster’s ailing Lord President, William St. Leger, that 
all Catholics were rebels, regardless of their actions, caused many Irish and Old English 
Catholics to take up arms for the rebel cause.  Furthermore, not long after St. Leger’s 
announcement, the Catholic clergy in Ireland made a similarly polarizing statement: the rebellion 
was, essentially, a conflict for the very souls of Catholics in Ireland; any Catholics who did not 
actively help the cause—let alone assist the opposition—were excommunicated.  Second, Barry, 
a colonel in the Irish army that Wentworth had raised prior to his impeachment, was the 
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commander of a force lodged on the southern coast at Kinsale, awaiting transportation to the 
continent where they were to be dispatched for Spanish service.183  Soon after the rebellion broke 
out, Barry received terse orders from St. Leger to disband his force.184  Instead, Barry led his 
force inland, soon joining the rude forces raised by various Catholic leaders in Limerick and 
Cork.   
Barry’s force is not only exceptional in its size but also its makeup.  In contrast to the 
rebel forces raised in Kerry or Clare, it contained a large number of men who had formal military 
training.  Ireland, after all, really only came into contact with the continental military revolution 
through its returning officers, as many had been formally trained in Flanders and/or Spain in the 
latest military tactics and weaponry.  In the north and east, men like Owen Roe O’Neill and 
Thomas Preston returned to their ancestral homeland and formed the base from which the 
Confederate military would be created.185  Through Barry, a professional soldier like those on the 
continent, Munster was given a head start in this process.  For instance, Barry introduced 
Swedish battle formations to the Confederate army.186   
The troop estimation given above of 6-7,000 is corroborated by most deponents and 
contemporary observers of the force.  Just less than half of this force was professional soldiers 
who were under Barry’s command at Kinsale; there were originally 3,000 soldiers slated to leave 
for Spain, and a small number deserted when they marched inland.  The force’s burgeoning 
numbers shortly after arriving in Limerick are testament to both the willingness of local Irish 
Catholics to rebel, but also the fear of the consequences attempted neutrality would bear after the 
statements made by both St. Leger and Irish Catholic priests.  Furthermore, they may have been 
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coerced to join by local Catholic leaders who themselves figure prominently in deponents’ 
accounts of this force in Munster. 
Further evidence that over half of Barry’s force was an amalgamation of troops raised 
locally in Limerick by Catholic leaders is that, until he was appointed by the Confederacy later in 
1642 as chief commander of Irish forces in Munster, his troops could hardly be considered solely 
under his control.  Patrick Purcell, Oliver Stephenson, Viscount Muskerry, Lord Roch, and 
various Fitzgeralds and Fitzedmonds are named as leaders of this force by deponents just as 
often as Barry is.  Despite Barry’s history as a professional soldier, these local magnates had 
raised their own forces; while they were willing to work with other Irish Catholics with similar 
goals, at this early, chaotic period in the rebellion with no firm central authority or leadership 
apparatus established, they were likely unwilling to remit control entirely of the forces they had 
raised.  For example, long before Barry’s force made its way to Limerick, Oliver Stephenson had 
raised 400-500 men and taken William Jarrett’s cattle around Christmas 1641.187  While 
understandable, the presence of possibly up to a dozen leaders with their own objectives was 
surely the cause of some headache as even after the consolidation of the Confederacy, 
confederate commanders often bickered amongst themselves.188  This may have contributed to 
the rebels’ defeat at the hands of Inchiquin’s royal forces in the only pre-confederation open field 
battle in Munster, at Liscarroll, 25 August 1642.189   
Nevertheless, the large force eliminated nearly every Protestant stronghold in county 
Limerick, and by the end of summer 1642, the county was effectively under complete Catholic 
control.  As opposed to Kerry and Limerick, where we only have accounts of a small handful of 
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castle sieges, in Limerick there are dozens.  Most of these castles have similar experiences as 
those we have already seen in Kerry and Clare: many Protestants left the countryside to take 
refuge in the castle, the castle was besieged by an organized band of rebels working in concert 
with the wider rebellion, and after a period of time the warders come to terms of surrender with 
the besieging force.  These durations varied: for example, castle Cullen withstood six months of 
siege before it eventually surrendered, while Newcastle was given up by its chief warder 
Anthony Hawkins after only three days.190  The results were often similar when the sieges ended: 
terms were decided that guaranteed the Protestant warders their lives and their goods should they 
promise to disperse and either seek passage back to England or not oppose the rebels militarily.  
These agreements, as in Clare and Kerry, were often complied with in part by the rebels who let 
the Protestant warders leave unharmed – but only after robbing them of all their goods, often 
including stripping the clothes off their backs.   
Where the castle sieges in Limerick differ from those we have already discussed is that 
they were characteristically bloodier than in Clare or Kerry.  John Stone was “barbarously 
murdered” outside of Newcastle soon after the warders surrendered.191  After Kilfeyney Castle 
was surrendered, three Irishmen and one Irish woman were hung by Edward Lacy, purportedly 
because they had betrayed their people by converting to Protestantism.192  Two Protestants were 
murdered as a warning outside of Castle Limerick, and the same tactic was used within sight of 
Castle Pallis in early August, 1642.193  During the siege at Castle Limerick, an unlucky 
Protestant lookout was shot out of the steeple in mid-May, dead before he hit the ground.194   
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Perhaps the bloodiest scene that took place during a castle siege in Limerick was at 
Castle Cullen.  Besieged for several months by Barry’s main army, the situation within the castle 
was dire: with many of the original 200 men, women and children dying of starvation and 
dehydration, the warders had been forced to kill the horses in the castle’s stable and parse the 
meat out among the remaining refugees.  When these makeshift foodstuffs ran out, a company of 
men took it upon themselves to organize a party to sally forth from the castle gates and forage 
the crops from a nearby field that was ripe for harvest.  How the rebel forces learned of the 
excursion is unclear, but regardless of whether it was by a Protestant informant or simply that the 
rebels expected a foraging expedition to the nearby field at some point, they were ready.  The 
rebels laid in wait in the fields and ambushed the party of Protestants who fled to the castle as 
quickly as possible, though by the end of the attack twenty-nine Protestant men, women and 
children laid dead outside the castle walls.  They were left there by the rebels to rot, and 
entreaties by the warders asking the rebels for permission to allow them to give their compatriots 
a Christian burial were denied.195 
Scenes such as this were not uncommon in Limerick while the rebels were clearing out 
Protestant castles and strongholds.  Irish Catholic rebels in Limerick showed a much higher level 
of animosity toward the Protestant refugees; the nature of its rebellion—both proper and 
popular—was far more consistent with the rest Ireland than with either Clare or Kerry.  This may 
be partially accounted for by the simple fact that in Limerick, unlike to the west and north, 
Protestants were fighting back.  Indeed, in Limerick we have this study’s only occurrences of 
local Protestants banding together and creating counter-rebellious forces.  John Cottrell, for 
example, had his house near Newcastle burned down by the rebels in early April, and shortly 
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thereafter he joined a small Protestant militia of one hundred men and forty horses.  Led by the 
Protestant landowner John Southwell, they encountered a rebel force on 12 April and, after an 
initial exchange of volleys, pursued them a few miles to the local grange where Southwell was 
killed by a rebel salvo.196   
An incredibly harrowing account of a Protestant company is given by James Keene and 
Thomas Dayly.  In early March, Keene and Dayly had joined a local company of Protestant 
musketeers led by a professional soldier, Captain Charles Price.  After journeying south to an 
army garrison in Mallow in county Cork to resupply, the musketeers were ambushed by a rebel 
force as they returned to their station north of Limerick.  The company was annihilated by the 
rebel fire, with only a handful of Protestant soldiers escaping into a nearby abandoned house.  
The rebels initially attempted to burn the house down, but the Protestant volleys from inside cut 
down so many that the Irish settled with firing on the house from afar.  Keene and Dayly 
maintained a firing position in the loft of the house for over two hours, exchanging shots with the 
rebels before they tired of the attack and left.  The ambushes portrayed in these attacks were 
characteristic of rebel and seventeenth-century Irish tactics in general.  They occurred 
everywhere; a little more than a week after Keene and Dayly’s perilous experience at the house 
in between Limerick and Mallow, they attacked a company of Irishmen who were hiding in the 
tall grass outside of Mitchelstowne Castle, presumably lying in wait to ambush any Protestant 
warders attempting an escape.197   
These proactive Protestant assaults on rebels in county Limerick would surely have raised 
the ire of Catholic rebels; soldiers and commanders alike would have been less inclined to offer 
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sanctuary to Protestant refugees leaving a surrendered castle after they had just been attacked by 
the refugees’ kinsmen.  English policy did not help matters.  Possibly spurring the popular 
violence against common English and Protestants alike, English army forces like those joined by 
Dayly and Keene adopted a strict stance against the insurrectionaries.  Seen by the English 
Crown and Parliament as treasonous rebels, no prisoners were taken; “all Irish [were] put to the 
sword.”198  Regardless of the charters signed between Barry’s force and surrendering Protestants, 
the warders were often treated roughly—certainly rougher than in Kerry—and most surrenders 
were accompanied by a handful of Protestants being hanged by the soldiers. 
The larger population—both Protestant and Catholic—of Limerick in comparison to 
Kerry and Clare not only meant there were more castles for the rebels to attack, but also that 
there were more forces, and the chaotic story of Limerick the depositions tell is far more similar 
to Ulster than to Limerick’s  western neighbors.  Unlike in Kerry, where Sugan’s force was the 
only large band present, Limerick had at least one other large force roaming the countryside 
during the initial period of rebellion.  Edward Lacy, a local Catholic landowner, raised and 
directed as many as 1,000 men and it is unclear whether he acted in concert with the large force 
nominally led by Barry or even with the wider rebellion itself.  Though Richard Harte heard 
Lacy claim to have the King’s commission and declare that it was the Lord Justices (Borlase and 
Parsons) and the Lord President of Munster (St. Leger) who were the actual rebels, Lacy’s 
actions were far more violent and destructive than the other rebel forces in the area.199  Lacy and 
his brother John were far more likely to pillage and murder indiscriminately than other rebels, 
though this may just be a reflection of the county in general.  For example, in March 1642 Lacy 
hung two of William Weekes’ neighbors without claiming to have any justification.  Lacy 
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returned multiple times to rob Elizabeth Dowdall’s house; the final time he approached with all 
1000 of his men and laid siege to her house.  After she surrendered they pillaged everything they 
could find before burning it to the ground.200  When John Arthur heard Lacy had hanged the man 
whom he had loaned out several milking cows to, Arthur approached Lacy in the hope of having 
his cows returned.  Lacy—portraying some uncharacteristic restraint—gruffly told Arthur to 
leave and never approach Lacy again if he did not wish his children to become orphans.201     
Though Lacy was most likely acting in the name of the rebellion proper, he is perhaps 
best viewed as an example of the differences between county Limerick and county Kerry.  
Whereas Kerry experienced very little popular violence, the Limerick depositions are rife with 
individuals acts of robbery and violence perpetrated against Protestants.  For example, William 
Ridgley encountered a band of about forty local Irishmen on 8 December 1641.  He recognized 
his neighbor Art McCahir as the leader of the band, and having already been robbed once on All 
Saints’ Day (1 November), Ridgley fled.  He watched from afar as McCahir and the local rebels 
stole everything of value from Ridgley’s house while shooting at it indiscriminately.202  A 
member of the O’Kelly family from Clare crossed the Shannon in the summer of 1642 and stole 
Symon Colston’s boats.203  Richard Winter, on his way to his fields, was approached by four 
strangers who assaulted him and took his clothes.204  Thomas MacGibbon entered the city of 
Limerick in mid-February and hung four Protestants as a warning to those who remained.205  In 
mid-April MacGibbon burned Richard Baxenden’s mill in Mohowny and many of the houses in 
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that settlement.206  Nicholas O’Helahan justified robbing Ann Eaton’s family by telling her that 
he had been ordered by both the Pope and the Queen to rob all Englishmen he could find.  Her 
mother died five weeks later from wounds after being hit with a rock in the altercation.207  These 
occurrences are just a few of the numerous accounts in Limerick of individual Irishmen acting of 
their own accord, using the rebellion as justification to rob and kill Protestants.  The prevalence 
of popular unrest in Limerick tends to be understated.  While it surely did not experience the 
same, horrific levels of atrocities as Ulster or Leinster (the forced drowning of 100-plus 
Protestants at the River Bann, for instance), these examples show clearly that robberies and acts 
of violence apart from those perpetrated by rebel forces occurred with some frequency in 
Limerick. 
This can be accounted for through the nature of seventeenth-century society in Limerick.  
Limerick had large settlements of Protestants.  While areas around Cork, Youghal, and 
Waterford were certainly more populated with Protestants than Limerick, its neighbors Kerry 
and Clare paled in comparison.208  Settlement was particularly large in the city of Limerick itself, 
though, it should be mentioned, its mayor Dominick Fanning joined forces with Barry and the 
other Catholic nobles in the county soon after the rebellion began.209  Furthermore, the 
settlements in Limerick adhered more strictly to guidelines and goals of plantation policy.  Most 
of the lands that were planted in Limerick were bought by the Earl of Cork when the original 
adventurer defaulted.  Under Cork’s stewardship, these settlements became the closest example 
of the homogenous, Protestant-only communities the Crown had intended them to be.  Through 
making contact with English and Dutch artisans and farmers, often at the port of Limerick, Cork 
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actively recruited Protestant families to settle on his plantation land outside of Limerick.  Cork 
influenced the city of Limerick as well, as he encouraged urban development in order to foster 
public order and create a safe environment that would entice more English to settle in the area.  
Moreover, as Lord Inchiquin, the Irish Protestant Earl of Thomond in Clare, expanded his 
landholdings across the Shannon and into Clare, he imitated Cork’s successful practices.210   
While these policies created the homogenous Protestant communities that the Crown had 
originally intended when it began the plantation policy, their existence adversely affected 
Protestant well-being during the uprising.  Without the commingling of Protestant and Catholic 
enclaves as there had been in Kerry, the rigid, religious-based classifications did not have the 
same opportunity to soften.  Furthermore, an increased level of plantation in Munster would have 
forced a larger percentage of Irishmen—in an already well-populated county—off their land in 
place of those Protestant communities.  These Irishmen would have rightfully characterized their 
ancestral land’s usurpers by their Protestantism, fostering sectarian animosity already prevalent 
in European society that had no chance of being quelled by the bonds of personal relationships 
due to the replacing community’s closed nature. 
In this light, it is perhaps most surprising that here we also find many conversions to 
Catholicism amongst the Protestant population.  The evidence suggests, however, that these may 
have been less willing converts than those found in county Kerry.  Unlike the accounts given of 
the Blenerhassets or Edward Vauclier, there are no accounts of Protestants converting and then 
actively aiding the rebel forces.  Some deponents are able to give names of those who had 
converted: John Massey claims his neighbor William Langford was now Catholic; Henry Briggs 
asserted that the Evans family of Ballingarry freely converted; Faith Grady even mentioned that 
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her local Justice of the Peace converted.211  Many of the conversions noted in Limerick, 
however, are non-descript, such as Elizabeth Lodge who simply relates that “divers other” 
Protestants have converted to Catholicism.212  Limerick is unique in that, rather than a series of 
willing Protestants becoming Catholic being related, many of the conversions in Limerick seem 
to have been forced.  John Cooke was robbed shortly after the rebellion began in late October by 
a company of seventy-five rebels under the command of Conn O’Rourke.  O’Rourke offered to 
return Cooke’s goods if he promised to start going to mass with his fellow Catholics.  When 
Cooke questioned O’Rourke on the alternatives, O’Rourke threatened to kill Cooke if he refused 
the offer.  Excusing his actions to the record taker by citing his children, Cooke admitted to 
converting to Catholicism on the spot, though he later regretted the decision.213  Ann Eaton, who 
was accused by a separate deponent of converting, admitted that the same O’Helahan who stole 
her goods and struck her mother with the eventually fatal blow told her that if she went to mass 
with him no harm would come to her.  Eaton converted, staking her very survival on her 
willingness to comply with the request.214 
Many of these coerced conversions were perpetrated by common Irishmen unassociated 
with the rebellion proper or any of the larger forces in the county.  While the disenfranchisement 
and loss of political authority was what Irish Catholic landowners were rising against, common 
rebels likely viewed the rebellion in a more confessional light; popular rebels characterized 
themselves and the purposes of the rebellion as both Catholic and Irish.  The sought-after 
reorientation of the social order meant that the newcomers—Protestant settlers—were fair game.  
Their being the object of attack had little to do with their religious practices and more to do with 
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the political and social authority they had usurped.  Furthermore, as societal lines became more 
“religious confession was becoming the easiest way to sort the population” for both the English 
and Irish governments and the Irish population in general.215  This classification system, 
solidifed after Confederation in 1642, is perhaps best exemplified by the murder of Irish 
Protestants by Irish Catholics at Kilfeyney.  In turn, English Protestants often viewed Catholics 
as guilty simply by being Catholic, regardless of whether they personally committed any acts of 
violence or robbery.216  These views, coupled with the Protestant counter-rebellion and the lack 
of heterogeneous societies, likely spurred the violence and vitriol present in Limerick’s rebellion.  
Kerry and Clare are largely the exceptions to the rule; the chaotic, bloody rebellion in county 
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By September 1642, Ormond controlled a large army of approximately 35,000 troops in 
Ireland.  Considering these figures and the relative disarray that still existed in the countryside, 
Scott Wheeler has posited that had civil war not broken out in England, the insurrection in 
Ireland could have been easily suppressed as rebellions often had in the last century.217  While 
this supposition is accurate when considering Ireland as a whole, the nuanced situation in 
western Munster—which this study has shown often shifted even town to town—shows the 
unique experience of each region during the opening periods of rebellion.  While its uniqueness 
has been acknowledged by modern scholars, too often generalizations about the area have been 
made using information from (admittedly much more vibrant) counties near the Munster-
Leinster border like Tipperary, and especially Waterford.  Though it is certainly important to 
understand the rebellion in western Munster as part of a general insurrection that quickly 
enveloped the entire island, recognizing sieges and robberies as essentially local events—
inherently subject to local history and personal attitudes—enriches not only the story of the 
rebellion, but our understanding of how Irish society functioned directly prior to this tumultuous 
period. 
The importance of understanding each locality on its own terms is certainly more crucial 
for Clare and Kerry than it is for Limerick.  Though certain similarities between the three 
counties exist (e.g., the conduct of rebel leaders after a castle siege had been broken, the 
haphazard movements and conduct of most rebel forces, Clare and Limerick both saw 
considerable popular violence), the nature of Limerick’s rebellion more closely resembles its 
eastern neighbors than it does Clare or Kerry.  In this study Limerick has largely been presented 
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not only as a counterweight to the other two counties, but as a representation of the rebellion in 
Munster as it is often portrayed.  Clare and Kerry both present special cases which have been 
routinely ignored in rebellion studies.  While this may be because of a general paucity of sources 
(Clare and Kerry combined produced fewer depositions than Limerick, and barely one-fifth what 
Cork produced), they have also been ignored because they generally do not fit the same mold as 
other counties in Munster.  
Kerry especially seems to have had a very different experience altogether; popular 
violence in the county was virtually non-existent.  Even the sieges of Protestant castles were 
more orderly than anywhere else in Munster or Ireland.  This is perhaps best exemplified at 
Tralee when Sugan’s rebels built gallows, and threatened to hang the Protestant men who had 
left the castle intending to negotiate.  When the Protestant warders refused to negotiate for the 
men’s lives, the rebels released the leaders, allowing them to rejoin their compatriots inside the 
castle walls.  In contrast, there are numerous accounts of Lacy in Limerick attempting the same 
leverage-wielding tactics, and being even happier to hang the warders afterwards.  Clare also 
presents its own special situation.  Although the insurrection was led by Gaelic Irishmen as in 
other counties, its chief Gaelic Irishman, Lord Inchiquin not only attempted to mollify 
Protestant-Catholic tensions in the county but commanded most of Munster’s troops who were 
fighting the very rebellion his kinsmen were propagating.  Furthermore, Clare, which had by far 
the smallest population of Protestants of any of the three counties in this study, actually showed a 
higher incidence of popular violence than Kerry.  The individual differences between all three 
counties exemplify—in a time when historians are continually finding new ways to weave the 
English, Scottish, and Irish experiences together—the importance of not losing an emphasis on 
localism.  Local conditions often drove seventeenth-century events: whether it was Edmund 
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Mainwaring fabricating stories of the Earl of Thomond’s collusion with the rebels, or Daniel 
Spratt correctly accusing Edward Vauclier of the same thing. 
  The stripping of Protestants by Irish rebels exhibited everywhere in Ireland was a 
symbolic inversion of the Protestant hierarchy which, while only nominally observed since 
plantation began, was more rigidly implemented in the 1630s by Charles I and the Protestant-
controlled Irish Parliament.  These deep-seated resentments at the quickly consolidated 
usurpation of traditionally Catholic authority in Ireland were what fueled the popular rebellion of 
Clare and Limerick, and its absence in Kerry speaks to the heterogeneous societies that the 
county developed.  Indeed, in Kerry where Protestants and Catholics commingled on a regular 
basis, previous relationships built between neighbors likely curbed Irish Catholic urges for 
vengeance. 
The very existence of these relationships fundamentally changes some of the basic 
assumptions historians have made when approaching the period.  Petty loans of cash, draught 
animals, and livestock between neighboring Protestants and Catholics suggest a certain level of 
trust across confessional and ethnic boundaries.  Economic relationships like these were vital to 
Irish commerce, whether it was between artisans and merchants in the cities or farmers in the 
countryside. Plantation policy intended to create closed Protestant communities failed due to 
basic economic needs and planters’ willingness to utilize the Irish Catholic tenant pool cheaply 
available.  In effect, this failing forced the two confessional communities to interact, in the 
process humanizing Protestants in the eyes of Catholics and vice versa.  
This study has also attempted to liberate the rebellion from its place in the religiously-
based propaganda of both the seventeenth century and today.   The actions of Irish Catholic 
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rebels and Protestant refugees in Clare, Limerick, and above all, Kerry support Canny’s 
assertions that practical, political reasons, such as patronage and privilege, more than religious 
ideology, spurred the rebellion.218  The rebellion, in its very essence, was a clash of cultures; that 
religion, be it Protestant or Catholic, was considered by contemporaries and later historians alike 
as the foundation of the two disparate societies is inconsequential to the aims of the partisans.219  
These common assumptions and classifications are the result of both Protestant commentators 
and twentieth-century Irish politics; after the 1641 rebellion, specifically because of John 
Temple’s The Irish Rebellion (1646) which for centuries was accepted as the official account of 
the insurrection, differentiations were no longer made between ethnic and religious groups.  
Religious and ethnic classifications in British and Irish society collapsed: Irishness was 
inherently Catholic, Britishness inherently Protestant.  It was not William Seames’ Anglicanism 
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